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YOUNG ADULTS AS A COGNIZABLE GROUP 
IN JURY SELECTION 
.Donald H. Zeig!er*t 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence that ju-
rors are to be chosen from a representative cross section of the com-
munity. This maxim has been articulated in cases construing the 
sixth amendment right to a jury trial, 1 the equal protection guaran-
tee,2 and the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal 
courts.3 Nevertheless, young adults are substantially under-
represented on the nation's jury rolls.4 In some jurisdictions, the 
" Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969, 
Columbia University.-Ed. 
t The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Richard Faust, Josephine Carl-
son, Jay Schulman, Eric Swanson, Gerard Gilbride, Elissa Krause, Lee O'Brien, and the Na-
tional Jury Project in designing the public opinion survey described herein, in supervising its 
administration, in analyzing the data, and in presenting the results. Special thanks are ex-
tended to the many volunteers who conducted the survey. The author also gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Anne Foner. This research was undertaken for a lawsuit challenging 
the exclusion of young adults from the grand jury rolls in Queens County, New York. See 
notes 5, 6, Part III infta. The litigation was conducted by the author while he was Attorney-in-
Charge, Special Litigation Unit, The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York. The litiga-
tion became moot due to substantial alteration in Queens County grand jury selection proce-
dures mandated by a change in state law. See N.Y. Juo. LAW§§ 500-23 (McKinney Supp. 
1978). 
l. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-31 (1975). 
2. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
3. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The principle is now also 
recognized by the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, §§ 101-04, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 
(1976). 
4. The pattern may be observed from Maine to California. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 
468 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (persons aged 21-24 
substantially excluded from federal petit jury panels in the Northern District of California); 
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 143-44 (7th Cir. 1972) (persons under age 25 inade-
quately represented on federal petit and grand jury rolls in the Eastern Division of the North-
ern District of Illinois); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564,569 n.13 (1st Cir. 1970) (young 
adults aged 21-34 underrepresented on federal grand jury rolls for the District of Maine); 
Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (young adults aged 21-40 
substantially underrepresented on state grand jury rolls for County of San Francisco); United 
States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (young people aged 21-29 under-
represented on federal petit jury rolls for the Northern District of Florida); United States v. 
Gargan, 314 F. Supp. 414, 415-16 (W.D. Wis. 1970), '!lf'd sub nom. United States v. Gast, 457 
F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972) (persons aged 18-21 totally excluded and 
those aged 21-26 substantially underrepresented on federal grand jury rolls for the Western 
District of Wisconsin); Julian v. State, 134 Ga. App. 592, 594, 215 S.E.2~ 496,497 (1975) (93% 
of grand jury pool consisted of white males whose average age was 69 years). Data docu-
1045 
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young are victims of overt discrimination. 5 In others, selection pro-
cedures neutral on their face systematically exclude young adults. 
Maintaining juror pools permanently,6 or even for two to four 
years,7 results in underrepresentation of the young, as does using 
source lists on which the young are not adequately represented.8 
menting the underrepresentation of young adults on petit and grand jury rolls in 12 federal 
judicial districts and in 29 cities and counties in 14 different states are presented in J. VAN 
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 331 app. H (1977). 
5. The young sometimes are excluded by law. Five states-Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Rhode Island and Utah-still require jurors to be 21 years old. Miss. CODE ANN. 
§ 13-5-1 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.010 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1975); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS§ 9-9-1 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-46-8 (1977). For a discussion of such 
exclusion, see note 171 i,!fi-a. 
Occasionally, juror selection officials openly admit that they discriminate. For example, 
until recently New York County officials did not solicit anyone under 35 to serve on a grand 
jury. United States ex rel Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). Similarly, until new procedures went into effect January I, 1978, 
officials in Queens County, New York, asked only older people if they wished to volunteer for 
grand jury service. Stipulated Factual Statement~ 42, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN 
(E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973). The Deputy Commissioner of Jurors in Erie County, New 
York, automatically exempted those who indicated on their questionnaires that they were stu-
dents, People v. Attica Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 492, 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (Sup. Ct. 1974), 
while the Assistant Co=issioner of Jurors in Albany County, New York, did not even send 
questionnaires to persons listed as students in town directories, People v. Marr, 67 Misc. 2d 
113, 115, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Just. Ct. 1971). See also Anderson v. Casscles, 531 F.2d 682 
(2d Cir. 1976). 
6. The maintenance of permanent juror pools inevitably causes severe underrepresentation 
of young people. In Queens County, New York, for example, juror officials maintained a 
permanent pool of approximately 6,000 grand jurors. Only approximately 350 new grand ju-
rors were placed in the pool each year. Stipulated Factual Statement ~~ 48-49, Johnson v. 
Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973). Even if young adults had been 
proportionately represented among the new jurors, the passage of time would have ensured 
that the jury pool was composed primarily of older people. The maintenance of the permanent 
pool, together with the discriminatory practices described in note 5 supra, produced a striking 
underrepresentation of the young on the Queens grand jury rolls. Although persons aged 18-
30 made up 27 .0% of the eligible population, only 5.3% of persons on the 1975 rolls were in 
that age group. Stipulated Factual Statement ~~ 60, 65a, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-
EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973). 
People v. Bartlett, 89 Misc. 2d 874, 881-83, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871-72 (Sup. Ct. 1977), con-
demned petit jury selection procedures on Staten Island, New York, which operated to exclude 
young people in much the same way as the procedures in Queens. The court stated: 
Richmond County has not fully reconstituted its jury pool since 1940. Once the pool 
stabilized at 18,000, no new persons were added except to replace those who died or other-
wise no longer qualified. These replacements, even if statistically reflecting the age of the 
community at the time added, never amounted to more than 2,000 persons in any year 
and could not balance off the aging panel. · 
89 Misc. 2d at 882, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 871. 
7. The 1972 amendment to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 allows each federal 
judicial district to maintain a pool of jurors for up to four years. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-269, § 2, 86 Stat. 117 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1976)). Although the young as 
a whole are not as severely underrepresented in such pools as they are in permanent pools, 
persons aged 18-21 are nevertheless totally excluded from service by the fourth year of their 
use. See text at notes 140-41 i,!fi-a. 
8. Both federal and state courts rely predominantly upon voter rolls as a source of jurors. 
See J. VAN DYKE, 257 app. A, 261 app. B. Young adults, however, generally are un-
derrepresented on the nation's voter rolls. One study demonstrated that only 58.1% of per-
sons aged 18-20, 59.5% of persons aged 21-24 and 66.1% of persons aged 25-29 register to vote, 
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Moreover, the young may be less willing to serve than their el-
ders9-service can interfere with schooling or child care and can be 
economically burdensome. 10 Finally, the great mobility11 of young 
people makes it difficult to solicit them for jury service. 
Courts generally have failed to correct underrepresentation of the 
young, and commentators have had little to say about it. Judges 
have lamented the underrepresentation caused by the unwillingness 
of the young to serve but have declined to remedy it, 12 since the law 
requires only that the selection process begin with a representative 
cross section and that identifiable groups not be intentionally or sys-
tematically excluded. 13 Where complaints have demonstrated that 
underrepresentation was either intentional or systematic, courts usu-
ally have denied relief on the ground that young people are not a 
sufficiently distinct and cohesive group to be "cognizable" for jury 
selection purposes. 14 Thus, underrepresentation of the young has 
been largely insulated from challenge. 
while as many as 80.2% of those aged 55-64 register. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 253, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION 
OF NOVEMBER 1972 (1973). See also Alicer, Hosticka & Mitchell, Jury Selection as a Biased 
Social Process, l l LAW & SocY. REV. 9 (1976). Nonetheless, virtually every court which has 
considered the exclusive use of voter rolls has approved the practice. See, e.g., Murrah v. 
Arkansas, 532 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1022 (5th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
1973); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245, 1248 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 
(1973); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972); 
United States v. Parker, 428 F.2d 488,489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970); People 
v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 749-51, 497 P.2d 1121, 1148-49, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 412-13 (1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973); People v. Breckenridge, 52 Cal. App. 3d 913, 921, 125 Cal. Rptr. 
425, 429 (1975). A compendium of such cases may be found in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 
77 n.18. At least one court has ordered supplementation of voter lists, Ford v. Hollowell, 385 F. 
Supp. 1392, 1399-400 (N.D. Miss. 1974). Another has endorsed the proposition that "[t]he 
voting list is not the end sought but only the means used to ensure that all cognizable groups 
within the populace are represented on juries. The voting list cannot be adequate if some 
groups are significantly underrepresented, regardless of the cause." United States v. Armsbury, 
408 F. Supp. I 130, 1140 (D. Ore. 1976). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); United States 
v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
10. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 124, 391-94 app. K. 
11. In a typical year, 42.6% of persons between the ages of 20 and 24 change their resi-
dence, while only 9.1% of those aged 45 to 64 move. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1973, at 37 (94th ed. 1974). 
12. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F. 2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 934 (1969). 
13. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 
(1965); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). On a broader view, however, 
systematic exclusion might subsume exclusion due to unwillingness to serve as well as exclu-
sion directly due to state practices. 
14. See Part II infra. On cognizability for jury selection purposes generally, see J. VAN 
DYKE, supra note 4, at 47-49, 62-72; Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions, printed in 
Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805,811 app., at 819-28 (5th Cir. 1975); Kairys, Juror Selection: The 
Law, a Mathematical Method of Analysis, and a Case Study, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 780-82 
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A leading case has held that a group is cognizable if it has a defi-
nite composition, is cohesive, and if its exclusion might result in bias 
by juries hearing cases in which group members are involved. 15 This 
Article contends that young adults meet these requirements and 
therefore are entitled to judicial review of the merits of their under-
representation claims. 16 The young are a distinct and identifiable 
group. They share attitudes, ideas, and experiences which are not 
adequately expressed on jury panels on which the young are under-
represented. Such underrepresentation thus produces bias against 
young criminal defendants and distorts deliberation. 
In support of its thesis, this Article presents what the literature 
has failed to provide: a comprehensive analysis of the concept of 
cognizability and empirical data. Part I traces the history of 
cognizability; identifies the sources of the cross-sectional right; and 
defines the criteria of cognizability, drawing special attention to the 
interests which a designation of cognizability protects. Part I also 
discusses the different approaches courts have taken to cognizability 
and suggests several factors which may explain the many treatments 
of the concept. 
Part II reviews the case law concerning the cognizability of 
young adults in particular. That Part also examines the traditional 
criteria of cognizability. 
Part III demonstrates that young adults satisfy the criteria of 
cognizability. The practical problem of defining age groups is ad-
dressed and the importance of age in determining general attitudes 
and outlook is explained. Since part of the rationale for broad repre-
sentation on jury panels is that the quality of deliberation and the 
results it produces are at stake, this Article offers evidence directly 
related to that question-the results of a public-opinion survey of 
attitudes on matters of signal importance to jury service. 17 Analysis 
of the data reveals significant and consistent differences in attitudes 
among persons in different age groups on criminal justice issues in 
general and on petit and grand jury service in particular. The great-
(1972); Comment, Underrepresentation of Economic Groups on Federal Juries, 51 B.U.L. REV. 
198 (1977); Note, Federal Courts-Juror Selection-Underrepresentation of Young Adults on 
Juror Source Lists, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1287 (1973); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: 
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1735-38 (1977). 
15. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), qffd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). 
16. This Article does not discuss the correctness of decisions which have reached the merits 
and rejected jury discrimination claims by the young. Its concern is cognizability. 
17. See Part IV infra. 
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est disparities in attitudes are between the youngest (18-30) and the 
oldest (61-75) age groups, and both groups are remarkably cohesive 
in their attitudes toward the issues probed. (Not surprisingly, older 
people are much more likely to be biased against the young than are 
younger people.) Finally, the data show that the correlations be-
tween attitudes and age are significantly stronger than the correla-
tions between attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income. Since 
racial groups, women, and, on occasion, occupational and income 
groups have been held cognizable, the data strongly suggest that 
young adults are cognizable a fortiori. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF COGNIZABILITY 
A. Historical .Development 
The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity is violated only by discrimination against "cognizable" groups. 
The right itself has several statutory and constitutional sources. 
Definitions of cognizability have therefore occurred in several differ-
ent contexts. Although cognizability was originally an equal 
protection concept, 18 it has also been employed by the Supreme 
Court in the exercise of its federal supervisory powers to define the 
scope of the right to a jury trial in federal courts in both civil 19 and 
criminal20 cases. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 196821 
specifically declares the cross-sectional ideal to be federal policy.22 
More recently, the Supreme Court's holding that state courts are 
bound by the sixth amendment's fair-cross-section requirement23 
created yet another forum for the application of the concept. 
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of cognizability in 
1879 in Strauder v. West Virginia.24 A black defendant sought to 
remove his criminal case to federal court on the ground that blacks 
were explicitly barred from jury service by state law.25 In sustaining 
the defendant's equal protection objection, the Court identified a 
number of constitutional values impaired by the exclusion. 
18. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476-82 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303, 307-10 (1879). 
19. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
20. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
21. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, §§ 101-04, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976). 
22. 28 u.s.c. § 1861 (1976). 
23. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
24. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
25. A removal statute permitted defendants who were denied their civil rights in state 
courts to remove their cases to federal court. 100 U.S. at 31 l. 
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First, barring blacks from juries endangered the defendant's right 
to a fair trial. The Court reasoned that if a black defendant were 
tried by a jury from which all blacks were excluded, decisions might 
be made not by an impartial assessment of the facts but on the basis 
of the defendant's race: "It is well known that prejudices often exist 
against particular classes in the community, which sway the judg-
ment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny 
to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection 
which others enjoy."26 Second, excluding blacks from juries injured 
members of the excluded class. To deny "the privilege of participat-
ing equally . . . in the administration of justice"27 stigmatized the 
entire excluded group, even those who might not wish to participate. 
It implied that they are unfit for service, and was "practically a 
brand upon them ... an assertion of their inferiority .... "28 
Strauder assumed that blacks were cognizable for jury selection 
purposes. It took judicial notice of the effects of past discrimination 
and of the need to protect blacks against continuing bias. But the 
Court in dictum limited cognizability to racial groups: 
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by 
the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its ju-
rors, and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selec-
tion to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, 
or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.29 
The Court did not discuss the issue of cognizability again until 
the 1940s.30 Then, in a series of four decisions, it enumerated new 
cognizable groups and identified additional interests protected by 
26. 100 U.S. at 309. 
27. 100 U.S. at 308. 
28. 100 U.S. at 308. 
· 29. 100 U.S. at 310. The Court intimated that racial or ethnic groups other than blacks 
also are cognizable: "Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen 
[from jury service], would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the (four-
teenth] amendment." 100 U.S. at 308. 
30. During the intervening years, the Supreme Court generally was unreceptive to jury 
challenges. The Court did condemn state statutes authorizing racial discrimination in juror 
selection. See, e.g., Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 
(1880). In addition, the Court occasionally reversed a conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings when the state court refused even to hear evidence of alleged racial discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1903); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900), 
More often, however, the Court relied upon procedural barriers to deny relief. Virginia v. 
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), and Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), held that the re-
moval statute used in Strauder was not available where jury officials had excluded blacks from 
juries because of their race without authority derived from the state constitution or laws. The 
proper remedy for challenging such de facto discrimination, the Court stated, was by way of a 
motion to quash the indictment, and if necessary, through normal state appellate procedures. 
Relief therefore was denied in both cases. Similarly, In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891), held 
that federal habeas corpus was not available to a state prisoner who had not properly 
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fully representative juries. In Smith v. Texas,31 an equal protection 
challenge to grand jury selection procedures, the Court reiterated the 
value of a cross-sectional jury, which it had recognized at least im-
plicitly in Strauder.32 "It is part of the established tradition in the 
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body 
truly representative of the community,"33 the Court stated. "For ra-
. cial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of 
otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the 
laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a dem-
ocratic society and a representative government."34 
Glasser v. United States35 applied these principles in interpreting 
the right to jury trial in federal courts.36 Under the federal jury se-
lection statute then in force, jurors in federal courts were to have the 
qualifications of jurors in the highest court of the state in which the 
federal court resided.37 When Illinois amended its laws to make wo-
men eligible for jury service, federal jury officials sought to supple-
presented his claims in state court so as to obtain ultimate Supreme Court review through 
normal channels. 
The Court also imposed substantial evidentiary barriers to jury-discrimination claims. 
When defendants made detailed written allegations that racial discrimination had caused the 
virtual absence of blacks from petit and grand juries, state trial judges often summarily denied 
the claims on the ground that such allegations were not proof. It is unclear, of course, how the 
defendants were to prove their claims if denied a hearing at which to call witnesses and present 
evidence. The Supreme Court generally affirmed. See Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); 
Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903); 
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896). Furthermore, in cases where state courts conducted 
hearings and found no racial discrimination despite clear evidence to the contrary, the Court 
refused to grant relief unless the state court finding was so devoid of evidentiary support as to 
amount to a denial of due process. See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909). 
Finally, in the 1930s the Court relaxed its evidentiary standards and reversed two state 
court decisions which had denied challenges to venires. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). In both cases, defendants had offered evi-
dence of a virtual absence of blacks on juries coupled with a clear opportunity to discriminate 
in the selection process. The Court held that such evidence constituted a prima facie case of 
discrimination and that the evidence submitted by the states in each case failed to rebut de-
fendants' presentations. The prima facie case doctrine, as it relates to cognizability, is dis-
cussed in the text at notes 104-08 i'!fra. 
31. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
32. 100 U.S. at 308. 
33. 311 U.S. at 130. 
34. 311 U.S. at 130 (footnote omitted). 
35. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
36. The Court's opinion might be viewed as resting upon statutory rather than constitu-
tional grounds since the selection procedure might have failed the Illinois requirement and 
would then have failed the federal statutory requirement. But the constitutional nature of the 
challenge, as well as the tone of the opinion, suggest that the sixth amendment at least strongly 
influenced the Court and was probably the principal source of its opinion. See 315 U.S. at 84-
87. A recent case seems to support this sixth amendment interpretation. See Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). 
37. 315 U.S. at 64. 
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ment their rolls with qualified women. Glasser alleged that the 
women added to the rolls were drawn exclusively from a list fur-
nished by the Illinois League of Women Voters and prepared solely 
from its membership. He further alleged that the women on the list 
had attended ''jury classes whose lecturers presented the views of the 
prosecution."38 
The Court upheld Glasser's claim in principle, reasoning: 
[Juror selection officials] must not allow the desire for competent 
jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the con-
cept of the jury as a cross-section of the community. . . . 
The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particu-
lar private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional 
requirements of a jury trial . . . . [T]he dangers inherent in such a 
method of selection are the more real when the members of those orga-
nizations from training or otherwise acquire a bias in favor of the pros-
ecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an 
organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addi-
tion, it is also openly partisan.39 
The Court ultimately denied Glasser's claim on the ground that he 
had not offered sufficient evidence in support of his allegations.40 
The decision nonetheless reaffirmed the necessity of an impartial 
jury and clearly recognized that racial and ethnic groups are not the 
only significant components of a representative cross section. 
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. ,41 the Court, pursuant to its su-
pervisory power over the administration of justice in federal courts, 
identified additional cognizable groups. The plaintiff, suing for 
damages in a federal diversity case, moved to strike the jury venire 
on the ground that lower-class working people had been systemati-
cally excluded and that only businessmen and others inclined toward 
the employer's viewpoint were, therefore, on the rolls.42 A hearing 
on the motion revealed that jury officials deliberately excluded from 
the rolls everyone who worked for a daily wage. The Court held that 
this practice failed to satisfy the principles of jury selection: 
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection 
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an 
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Smith v. 
Texas . . . ; Glasser v. United States . . . . This does not mean, of 
38. 315 U.S. at 84. 
39. 315 U.S. at 86. 
40. See 315 U.S. at 87. 
41. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
42. Thiel, a passenger, had jumped out of the window of a moving train operated by the 
Southern Pacific Company. He sought to recover damages on the ground that railroad em-
ployees were negligent in failing to keep safe a passenger so clearly "out of his normal mind." 
328 U.S. at 218-19. 
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course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the eco-
nomic, social, religious, racial, political and geographic groups of the 
community; frequently such complete representation would be impos-
sible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by 
court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of 
these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible 
for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury com-
petence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact 
lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the 
door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to 
the democratic ideals of trial by jury.43 
Thiel is the Court's most expansive treatment of cognizability. 
The Court assumed that a broad range of groups are distinct and 
identifiable, and that members of each share attitudes and exper-
iences which may not be adequately represented if they are excluded 
from service. The Court did not require proof that the exclusion of 
wage earners prejudiced Thiel. The mere danger of such prejudice 
justified the Court, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, in order-
ing a new trial by a jury fairly chosen. 
The Court's expansive approach continued in Ballard v. United 
States,44 which involved a challenge to the intentional and system-
atic exclusion of women from the grand and petit jury rolls in the 
Southern District of California. In sustaining the challenge, the 
Court assumed that women are a cognizable group, without requir-
ing proof that women share attitudes or perspectives different from 
men's: 
It is said . . . that an all male panel drawn from the various groups 
within a community will be as truly representative as if women were 
included. The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the 
action of women are the same as those which influence the action of 
men-personality, background, economic status-and not sex. Yet it 
is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor 
tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the 
shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly 
representative of the community if all men were intentionally and sys-
tematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes 
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different 
from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence 
one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the court-
room from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. 
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The 
exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the 
43. 328 U.S. at 220. 
44. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
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community than would be true if an economic or racial group were 
excluded.45 
The Court also stated that the defendants' claim did not depend 
on a showing of prejudice in the individual case, because "[t]he in-
jury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury sys-
tem, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to 
the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."46 
Again acting in the exercise of its federal supervisory powers, the 
Court overturned the convictions. 
Any hope that the standards enunciated in the 1940s would usher 
in an era of representative juries dimmed when the Court next con-
sidered cognizability in 1954. Hernandez v. Texas47 signalled a 
change in approach. Hernandez was indicted for murder and con-
victed in Jackson County, Texas. He alleged that Mexican-Ameri-
cans were systematically excluded from service as grand and petit 
jurors in the county, thus depriving him of the equal protection of 
the laws. Since he established a prima facie case of discrimination 
which the state was unable to rebut, the Court reversed his convic-
tion. In considering his claim, however, the Court articulated new 
criteria of cognizability: 
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined eas-
ily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the 
courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community 
prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from 
the community norm may define other groups which need the same 
protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a ques-
tion of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and 
it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that 
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classifica-
45. 329 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). 
46. 329 U.S. at 195. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), there was no majority opinion, 
but three justices elaborated on the interests protected by representative juries (opinion of 
Marshall, J.,joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.). In Peters, a white defendant challenged the 
systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petitjuries in Muscogee County, Georgia. The 
state argued that the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion, but the Court concluded 
that the argument took "too narrow a view of the kinds ofhann that flow from discrimination 
in jury selection." 407 U.S. at 498. It stated that "the exclusion from jury service of a substan-
tial and identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive 
to admit of confinement to particular cases." 407 U.S. at 503. The Court was unwilling to 
assume that exclusion of blacks is relevant only to racial issues. 
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, 
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of 
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not 
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to 
conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events 
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented. 
407 U.S. at 503-04. 
47. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
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tion, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.48 
The Court did not simply assume that Mexican-Americans were 
a cognizable group. Instead, it held that Hernandez had an "initial 
burden" of proving that "persons of Mexican descent constitute a 
separate class in Jackson County, distinct from 'whites.' "49 The 
question whether this might be accomplished simply by judicial no-
tice, the Court observed in a footnote, was not before it.50 But the 
Court stated that another way to establish cognizability was to show 
the "attitude of the community.''51 Hernandez satisfied that burden 
by demonstrating that the community generally distinguished be-
tween "white" and "Mexican," that Mexican-Americans were less 
involved than whites in business and community groups, that chil-
dren of Mexican descent had recently been required to attend a seg-
regated school, and that Mexican-Americans were discriminated 
against in the use of dining and public toilet facilities. 52 
Although Hernandez prevailed, the case marks the first potential-
ly limiting use of the cognizability concept. To be sure, Hernandez 
permitted judicial notice of groups in appropriate cases. Nonethe-
less, the Court's opinion intimated that members of less easily 
identifiable groups subjected to subtler forms of community bias 
might have greater difficulty establishing their cognizability than in 
the 1940s.53 And, in the years following Hernandez, courts have be-
come increasingly reluctant to find groups cognizable. Women and 
various racial, ethnic, and religious groups have met with the most 
success, while occupational, income, and geographical groups, and 
groups defined by education or age generally have not been recog-
nized. 
After Ballard, courts assumed that women were a cognizable 
48. 347 U.S. at 478. 
49. 347 U.S. at 479 (footnote omitted). 
50. 347 U.S. at 479 n.9. 
51. 347 U.S. at 479. 
52. 347 U.S. at 479-80. 
53. Although Hernandez is often interpreted as establishing more stringent proof require-
ments, in the case itself, cognizability enlarged, not limited, the cross-sectional right. When the 
Court said that community prejudices were not static and that, at different times, different 
groups might need the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment, 347 U.S. at 478, it was 
responding to the view that only blacks are protected by the equal protection clause. In find-
ing that plaintiffs had convincingly shown that Mexican-Americans were a separate class in 
Jackson County, distinct from whites, 347 U.S. at 479, the Court hardly meant to require such 
complete proof for every equal protection challenge, since it expressly reserved the question 
whether the cognizability of Mexican-Americans might have been judicially noticed. 347 U.S. 
at 479 n.9. Both the explicit language and the tenor of the opinion suggest that the Court 
viewed the identifiability "requirement" as expanding, not limiting, the equal protection guar-
antee. If this suggestion is true, Hernandez should not be interpreted as imposing rigorous 
proof requirements where none previously existed. 
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group,54 and condemned their intentional exclusion from juries.55 
Until recently, however, states were allowed to grant women blanket 
exemptions sol~ly because of their sex or could even make registra-
tion for jury duty a prerequisite of service for women but not for 
men.56 In 1975, Taylor v. Louisiana57 firmly rejected such discrimi-
nations. The Court held that the sixth amendment was violated by a 
state law which permitted women to serve on juries only if they had 
previously declared their interest in jury service and which resulted 
in the complete exclusion of women from the venire. 
Taylor is particularly important because it relies on the sixth 
amendment. Although the Court had previously held that the sixth 
amendment was binding upon the states by virtue of the fourteenth 
amendment, 58 Taylor established for the first time that "the selection 
of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is 
an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial."59 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found "instructive" 
its prior cases involving the equal protection clause and the exercise 
of supervisory powers over federal trials, 60 and it reaffirmed some of 
the policies supporting the requirement of a fair cross section: 
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary 
power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the commu-
nity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in 
preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased re-
sponse of a judge. . . . This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the 
jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if 
large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community par-
ticipation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not 
only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to pub-
lic confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); Ford v. White, 430 F.2d 
951, 955 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970); United 
States v. DiTo=aso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969). 
55. See United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 428 (3d Cir. 1971); Abbott v. Mines, 411 
F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Mayfield v. Steed, 345 F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Ark. 1972), affd. 
per curiam, 473 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1973); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 
1966). 
56. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), for example, the Supreme Court approved a 
statute which provided that "the name of no female person shall be taken for jury service 
unless said person has registered with the clerk of the circuit court her desire to be placed on 
the jury list." 368 U.S. at 58. Noting that the law "does not purport to exclude women from 
state jury service," 368 U.S. at 60, the Court found the statute to be based on a reasonable 
classification since "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." 368 U.S. 
at 62. 
57. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
59. 419 U.S. at 528. 
60. 419 U.S. at 526-28. 
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jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments 
playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the con-
stitutional concept of jury trial.61 
Applying these principles, the Court found that women are 
"sufficiently numerous and distinct from men," i.e., that they are 
cognizable.62 It concluded that, as in Ballard, the systematic exclu-
sion of women rendered the jury less representative in a subtle but 
substantial way and violated the fair-cross-section requirement.63 
The Court conceded that an earlier case, Hoyt v. Florida,64 had held 
that a similar discrimination did not violate the due process or equal 
protection guarantees since the state interest in preserving a distinct 
societal role for women was a sufficiently rational basis for the exclu-
sion.65 
But Hoyt did not involve a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community .... The right 
to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds. 
There must be weightier reasons if a distinctive class representing 53% 
of the eligible jurors is for all practical purposes to be excluded from 
jury service.66 
This passage suggests that Taylor established a broader cross-sec-
tional right under the sixth amendment than under the equal protec-
tion clause. On the other hand, the Court may simply have been 
searching for some facially plausible ground for distinguishing Hoyt. 
It remains to be seen whether Taylor will be interpreted as broaden-
ing the concept of cognizability in sixth amendment cases. 
B. .D!fferent Approaches to the Cognizability of Particular Groups 
Courts have often simply taken judicial notice of the 
cognizability of racial, ethnic, and religious groups. For example, 
courts have assumed the cognizability of Indians in Mellette County, 
South Dakota;67 of Mexican-Americans in Logan County, Colo-
rado;68 of Puerto Ricans in St. Croix, Virgin Islands;69 and of non-
61. 419 U.S. at 530. 
62. 419 U.S. at 531. 
63. 419 U.S. at 530. The Court was impressed with evidence that "women bring to juries 
their own perspectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and result." 419 U.S. at 
532 n.12. 
64. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
65. 419 U.S. at 533-34. See note 56 supra. 
66. 419 U.S. at 534. 
67. State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 N.W.2d 654 (1971). 
68. Montoya v. People, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959). 
69. United States ex rel Leguillo v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392, 398 (D.V.I. 1953), revd. on 
other grounds, 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1954). 
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Caucasians in Hawaii.70 Similarly, the opinion in Quadra v. Superior 
Court11 assumed that racial groups are cognizable "under judicial 
notice of obvious sociological facts throughout this nation."72 With 
respect to religious groups, some courts have stated without discus-
sion that Jews,73 Catholics,74 and persons who do not believe in a 
supreme being75 are cognizable. 
In United States v . .DeAlba-Conrado,16 on the other hand, the 
court remanded the case for a hearing on whether Latin-Americans 
constitute a cognizable group in Miami, Florida.77 And in Quadra, 
although the court expressed little doubt "that persons of Latin-
American descent and of Chinese and Japanese ethnic origin are 
identifiable groups within San Francisco,"78 it refrained from decid-
ing whether to take judicial notice of their cognizability or to require 
plaintiffs to submit proof at a later hearing.79 Finally, in Grech v. 
Wainwright, 80 the court stated that proof of cognizability of mem-
bers of the Jewish faith in the geographical areas from which the 
jury was drawn was critical to the constitutional claim of jury exclu-
sion. 81 
Courts generally have held occupational groups cognizable 
where the discrimination was similar to that proscribed in Thiel. For 
example, People v. White82 assumed the cognizability of "hourly 
70. United States v. Fujimoto, 105 F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii 1952). In State v. Lopez, 182 
Kan. 46,318 P.2d 662 (1957), the court assumed that Mexican-Americans generally are a cog-
nizable group. The Court declined to find them cognizable in Geary County, Kansas, how-
ever, because defendant was unable to establish that this ethnic group made up a significant 
portion of the community. The 1950 census figures revealed that of a total population of 
21,671, only 92 were of"other races." The Court concluded that "the Mexican population, if 
any, in Geary County was not large enough to raise a presumption of systematic exclusion 
from jury service." 182 Kan. at 51, 318 P.2d at 665. 
71. 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
72. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19. 
73. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,213 A.2d 475 (1965). See also State v. Madison, 240 
Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). 
74. United States v. Suskin, 450 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1971). 
75. Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925). 
76. 481 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1973). 
77. 481 F.2d at 1270 n.7. 
78. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19. 
79. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,495 (1977), and Muniz v. 
Beto, 434 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1970), found that the defendants had submitted adequate 
proof of the cognizability of Mexican-Americans in the Texas counties of Hidalgo and El Paso, 
respectively. Similarly, State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637,645,325 A.2d 251,256 (1973), found 
that the record established the cognizability of Puerto Ricans in Fairfield County, Connecticut. 
80. 492 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1974). 
81. 492 F.2d at 749 n.3. 
82. 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954) (en bane). 
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wage earners and those ofless•fortunate economic circumstances"83 
in condemning the selection of jurors from lists of local clubs and 
associations whose members, for the most part, were weU-to-do busi-
nessmen. 84 Similarly, Simmons v. State85 assumed the cognizability 
of "common laborers" in barring their intentional, systematic exclu-
sion from the jury rolls in Aluchua County; Florida.86 
In other cases, however, courts have refused to recognize occupa-
tional or income groups because the group in question was inade-
quately defined or because proof of community attitudes toward the 
group was lacking. In Quadra, for example, plaintiffs challenged the 
underrepresentation of low-income blue-collar workers. The court 
dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs had made "virtually no 
effort to define this class as a distinct, identifiable group in the com-
munity."87 The Court held that the plaintiffs had not drawn a ra-
tional line between blue-collar and white-collar workers and that the 
low-income class they attempted to construct was "too imprecise and 
undoubtedly over-inclusive" given the relatively high wages ·paid 
many workers in craft occupations.88 Finally, the plaintiffs had 
failed to allege facts pertaining to community attitudes which would 
"give some content" to the group. 89 
Similarly, United States v. Mc.Daniels90 refused to recognize ei-
ther the poor or food-stamp recipients as cognizable under the fed-
eral Jury Selection and Service Act.91 The Court stressed that any 
line dividing the poor from the affluent is inherently arbitrary, since 
"there is no national standard of who is poor and who is not poor."92 
The Court also noted that one's economic status may change from 
83. 43 Cal. 2d at 753, 278 P.2d at 17. 
84. The Court ultimately denied relief on the ground that all occupational and income 
groups seemed adequately represented on the actual venire of 525 persons from which the jury 
was chosen. 43 Cal. 2d at 753, 278 P.2d at 17. 
85. 182 So. 2d 442 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). 
86. See also Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 713-14, 719-24 (5th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (court assumed cognizability of daily wage earners, a group com-
prised of manual laborers and outside workers). 
87. 378 F. Supp. at 621. 
88. 378 F. Supp. at 621. The Census Bureau's categorization of occupational titles is useful 
in solving this problem. The system developed from the 1970 census consists of 441 specific 
occupation categories arranged into 12 major occupation groups. Information on the composi-
tion of the detailed categories is given in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF 
POPULATION, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS (1971). 
89. 378 F. Supp. at 621. See also People v. Navarette, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1064, 1077, 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 55, 63-64, (1976). 
90. 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973). 
91. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1861-74 (1976). 
92. 370 F. Supp. at 307. 
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year to year and that "the elusiveness o~the concept [of poverty] and 
the changes in purchasing power of money make the use of such a 
classification difficult."93 Finally, since no proof was submitted that 
food-stamp recipients share attitudes or opinions different from 
those of other groups, the Court found the classification meaningless 
for jury selection purposes.94 
Similar reasoning also may underlie the reluctance of courts to 
consider educational groups cognizable. Many courts have stressed 
the absence of proof that the uneducated share distinct attitudes or 
characteristics which set them apart from the rest of society and 
which cannot be adequately represented by the educated.95 The 
view that the uneducated are not necessary to a representative cross 
section also may stem from the belief that juries perform better with-
out them. Thus, courts have uniformly approved minimum educa-
tional requirements for jurors.96 
Many of the expansive earlier pronouncements on cognizability 
involved the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory powers over 
federal trials. Although these early decisions generally relied little 
upon the language of the applicable federal statute,97 the passage of 
the Jury Selection and Service Act98 in 1968 gave federal courts 
more explicit guidance for determining cognizability. The Act de-
clared it to be federal policy "that all litigants in federal courts enti-
93. 370 F. Supp. at 308. 
94. See also United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977). 
95. E.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Potter, 552 F.2d 901,905 (9th Cir. 1977). United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), 
recognized such a group. The Court noted the difficulty in defining precisely a less educated 
group, but held that "the less educated are a sufficiently large group with sufficiently distinct 
views and attitudes that its diluted presence on the actual jury pools requires explanation." 
420 F.2d at 571. 
96. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commn., 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 
U.S. 565, 589 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
Courts also have refused to hold geographical groups cognizable. Although such groups 
are relatively easy to define, United States v. Bryant, 291 F. Supp. 542, 551 (D. Me. 1968), 
complainants normally have been unable to demonstrate that people in different parts of a 
district have significantly different attitudes or that there is likely to be bias in the absence of a 
residential cross section. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. 
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir. 1970); Quadra 
v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 619-21 (N.D. Cal. 1974); State v. Townsend, 167 Conn. 
539, 548-50, 356 A.2d 125, 132-34 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846 (1975); People v. Chesler, 
91 Misc. 2d 551, 557, 398 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1977). If discrimination by residence 
results in underrepresentation of other identifiable groups, a designation of residential 
cognizability might be a convenient way to alleviate that problem. In most instances, however, 
it is easier to address underrepresentation of other groups directly. 
97. The earlier federal statute gave almost no guidance to federal courts, since it simply 
incorporated state standards. Judicial Code, ch. 231, §§ 275-278, 36 Stat. 1164, I 165 (1911). 
98. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at 
§§ 101-04, 28 u.s.c. §§ 1861-74 (1976)). 
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tled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries 
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community 
••• " 99 and that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from [federal jury] 
service . . . on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
or economic status."100 Courts have generally interpreted these pro-
visions as stricter than the constitutional fair-cross-sectional require-
ment and have held that compliance with the statute constitutes 
compliance with the Constitution. 101 And its procedural specificity 
and breadth of purpose have encouraged courts to employ the stat-
ute rather than the vaguer supervisory power as the standard for jury 
challenges in federal courts.102 Nevertheless, reliance on the federal 
statute has not led courts to interpret cognizability much more gener-
ously than in constitutional cases. 103 
C. Possible Explanations of the Conflicting Lines of Authority 
It is difficult to harmonize the divergent and often conflicting 
lines of authority interpreting the cross-sectional ideal. In some 
cases, courts have freely taken judicial notice that a group is cogniza-
ble. In others, they have required proof of cognizability and been 
sensitive to line-drawing problems. A number of factors may ex-
plain these differences in approach, especially the recent reluctance 
of the courts either to extend the list of groups considered cognizable 
or even to recognize groups previously considered identifiable. An 
examination of these factors, however, suggests that none of them 
provides a valid basis for that reluctance. 
The first possible explanation for the divergent judicial ap-
proaches and outcomes is that they may vary according to the nature 
of the proof offered to support or refute the claim of discrimination. 
In Thiel and similar cases, in which challenges to juries were sus-
tained, the defendants explicitly admitted there had been intentional 
or systematic exclusion of persons in specific occupations or social 
strata. But in cases such as Quadra and Mc.Daniels, in which chal-
lenges failed, those challenging selection procedures had had to rely 
on the prima facie case doctrine. Since its first application in 
1935, 104 that doctrine has been a formidable weapon in challenges to 
99. 28 u.s.c. § 1861 (1976). 
100. 28 u.s.c. § 1862 (1976). 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 937 (1973). 
102. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 574-75 (1st Cir. 1970). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 585-86 (10th Cir. 1976). 
104. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), discussed in note 30 supra. 
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unrepresentative juries. But the very strength of the doctrine may 
have worked to undermine it. Courts may fear that if they find 
many occupational and income groups cognizable, the presence and 
effectiveness of the doctrine may inspire innumerable challenges to 
jury selection procedures. 
The prima facie case doctrine offers plaintiffs several advantages 
over traditional modes of proof. First, direct proof of discrimination 
is not required. A showing of significant disparities between the 
composition of the jury rolls and the composition of the community, 
coupled with a showing that jury officials had an opportunity to dis-
criminate in the selection process, establishes a prima facie case and 
shifts the burden to jury officials to prove that the disparities resulted 
from something other than discrimination. 105 Since mere affirma-
tions of good faith are not a sufficient rebuttal, 106 jury officials often 
are hard pressed to sustain their burden. Second, the challenger de-
fines the class. In cases of admitted, intentional discrimination, jury 
officials "define" the excluded group by their statements and actions. 
In a prima facie case, by contrast, a broader range of challenges nor-
mally is plausible since jury rolls in most jurisdictions under-
represent blacks, various ethnic groups, women, the young, the old, 
the uneducated, the poor, and many occupational groups. 107 
Of course, courts can regulate the use of the prima facie case doc-
trine by declining to hold the groups in question cognizable. Con-
cern about abuse of the doctrine, however, does not justify a narrow 
interpretation of cognizability. Abuse could more effectively be min-
imized by requiring that a greater disparity be shown to establish a 
prima facie case or by easing the defendant's burden on rebuttal. 
Limiting cognizability is clumsy and perpetuates unrepresentative 
juries.108 
The second reason for courts' reluctance to hold groups cogniza-
ble may be their confusion of the concepts of cognizability and sus-
pectness. Both concepts protect identifiable groups from 
discrimination, but the similarity ends there. To say, for example, 
that legislative or administrative classifications based on socioeco-
nomic status are suspect means that all such governmental classifica-
105. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 
625, 630-32 (1972). 
106. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,498 n.19 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 
625, 632 (1972). 
107. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 291-371 apps. F-1. 
108. Of course, any new restriction on the prima facie case doctrine might perpetuate un-
representative juries. But cognizability is a particularly unfortunate kind of restriction since it 
entirely insulates discrimination against certain classes from any judicial protection. 
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tions are subject to strict equal protection scrutiny and will fall 
unless the government can show that they are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent to 
Massachusetts .Board of Retirement v. Murgia: 109 
If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or nearly 
always, . . . is struck down. . . . It should be no surprise, then, that 
the Court is hesitant to expand the ... classes subject to strict scrutiny, 
when each expansion involves the invalidation of virtually every 
classification bearing upon a newly covered category. 110 
To say, on the other hand, that low-income people are a cognizable 
group has a much more limited effect. It merely means that they 
may not be discriminated against in jury selection. This difference in 
consequence probably explains why women and racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups, and on occasion, age, occupational, income and ed-
ucational groups, have been held cognizable for jury selection pur-
poses, while the only suspect classifications are those based on race, 
alienage, or national origin.111 
The courts have not applied the traditional two-tier model of 
equal protection analysis to jury selection cases, 112 perhaps because 
the concepts of cognizability and suspectness serve such different 
purposes or perhaps because of the awkwardness of that model. In-
stead, courts have apparently held that discrimination against a cog-
nizable group is simply impermissible, but that discrimination 
against a group which does not fully satisfy the cognizability criteria, 
while perhaps undesirable, is not sufficiently important to merit judi-
cial intervention. It seems unlikely that courts will apply the two-tier 
model in this area. Although theoretically applicable, it does not ma-
terially aid the evaluation or resolution of jury discrimination 
claims, and it would have implications outside the jury area that 
courts may wish to avoid. 113 
109. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
ll0. 427 U.S. at 319 (footnote omitted). 
111. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17-29 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370-
72 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 
8-12 (1967); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-47 (1948). 
ll2. See, e.g., Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 616 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
113. The two-tier model could theoretically be applied by holding that discrimination 
against a cognizable group can be justified only by showing that it is necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, while discrimination against a noncognizable group need 
only have a rational basis. On this approach, however, a designation of cognizability amounts 
to a finding that the group is suspect for jury selection purposes. Such a finding might be 
viewed as a first step toward expanding the list of suspect classifications, something the present 
Court seems disinclined to do. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (only four 
Justices agree that sex is a suspect class); San, Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. I (1973) (wealth discriminations do not involve a suspect class); Massachusetts-Bd. of 
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Finally, the divergent lines of authority may be partly accounted 
for by the fact that the cross-sectional right has several sources. 
These include the sixth amendment, the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, and in federal courts, the Jury Selection 
and Service Act of 1968. In addition, the Supreme Court, in the ex-
ercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, has required 
that juries be composed of a fair cross section. The courts have not 
explicitly stated that either the scope of cognizability or the kind or 
quantum of proof required to establish a cognizable group varies de-
pending upon the source of the right. Nonetheless, there is some 
evidence that such variations exist. 
It is true that, to date, courts have treated cognizability in much 
the same manner in sixth amendment and equal protection cases. 
This is not surprising, since the interests protected are often coexten-
sive. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 114 an equal protection case, the 
court noted that racial discrimination in jury selection endangers the 
defendant's right to a fair trial 115 and denies members of the ex-
cluded class the right to participate equally in the administration of 
justice. 116 Smith v. Texas, 117 also an equal protection case, stressed 
that a representative jury is important to "the use of juries as instru-
ments of public :,ustice"118 and that exclusion of otherwise qualified 
groups "is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and 
a representative government." 119 Hernandez v. Texas 120 held that 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (age is not a suspect classification), If, 
on the other hand, discrimination against cognizable (but nonsuspect) groups is evaluated only 
under the rational-basis test, the discrimination would doubtless be justified on the ground of 
administrative convenience, and dismissal of the complaint would almost inevitably follow, 
This latter injustice might be eased by applying an intermediate equal protection test, see 
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 16-30, 16-31 (1978), to jury discrim-
ination against cognizable (but nonsuspect) groups. The state practice would be upheld if it 
substantially furthered an important governmental interest; administrative convenience would 
be an insufficient justification. The Court has endorsed the general use of this test for gender 
classifications, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and four of the five members of the 
Court who addressed the constitutional issue in University of California Bd. of Regents v. 
Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2783-2785 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting), would apply the test to 
benign racial preferences. Such a test perhaps is appropriate here. While not "suspect," cogni-
zable groups are by definition important segments of the community. Their total (or partial) 
exclusion from juries implicates both the defendant's significant interest in an unbiased and 
fair-cross-sectional jury and society's vital interest in preserving the democratic ideal of the 
jury. An intermediate test might help reconcile theory with result in the jury discrimination 
area. However, if the Court is unwilling to employ this standard, the two-tier equal protection 
model seems wholly inapposite to jury discrimination claims. 
114. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
115. 100 U.S. at 309. 
116. 100 U.S. at 308. 
117. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
118. 311 U.S. at 130. 
119. 311 U.S. at 130. 
120. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
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when distinct groups are singled out for different treatment without 
justification, the equal protection clause is violated. 121 The broad 
language of Hernandez clearly encompasses the interests of both a 
defendant who is a member of the excluded group and of other 
group members as well. 
Cases relying on the sixth amendment stress the same interests as 
the equal protection cases. Glasser v. United States, 122 which appears 
to be based on the sixth amendment, 123 emphasized the defendant's 
right to a jury which is not biased in favor of the prosecution. 124 It 
also condemned a jury that is "the organ of a special class" as 
incompatible with traditional democratic ideals. 125 Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 126 which explicitly relies on the sixth amendment, cites 
the defendant's interest in an unbiased jury and the value of full 
community participation in the administration of criminal law as the 
interests protected by a fully representative jury. 127 Thus, since des-
ignations of cognizability serve essentially the same interests whether 
the source of the cross-sectional right is the equal protection clause 
or the sixth amendment, the courts have properly used the cases 
based on these two constitutional provisions interchangeably for 
cognizability purposes. 128 
A difference in approaches to cognizability is observable, how-
ever, between cases involving the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
121. 347 U.S. at 478. 
122. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
123. See note 36 supra. 
124. 315 U.S. at 86. 
125. 315 U.S. at 86. 
126. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
127. 419 U.S. at 530-31. 
128. As noted earlier, one passage in Taylor does imply that there is a broader cross-sec-
tional right under the sixth amendment than under the equal protection clause. See text at 
notes 63-66 supra. But the Court was attempting to distinguish Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 
(1961), a case it was effectively overruling. Thus, the Court's discussion should not be inter-
preted too liberally. / 
Of course, the sixth amendment and the equal protection clause do-not apply coextensively 
to all jury discrimination claims. By its terms, the sixth amendment only applies to criminal 
juries, and even then only to petit juries. Although the fifth amendment's grand jury require-
ment might entail a fair-cross-sectional right in federal grand juries, see Castaneda v. Partida, 
430 U.S. 482, 509-10 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting), that fifth amendment requirement has not 
yet been applied to the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Thus it appears 
that state grand jury and civil jury selection procedures are governed only by the equal protec-
tion clause. Moreover, the different nature of the injuries has created somewhat different 
standing doctrines in sixth amendment and equal protection cases. Although a criminal de-
fendant who does not belong to the excluded class has standing in both types of cases, Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975); Peters v. K.iff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a member of the 
excluded class has standing to raise only an equal protection claim, Carter v. Jury Commn., 
396 U.S. 320 (1970), not a sixth amendment claim. 
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supervisory power over the federal courts, and cases involving con-
stitutional rights. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 129 and Ballard v. 
United States, 130 which contain the Supreme Court's most expansive 
treatments of cognizability, both rested on the supervisory power. In 
Thiel, the Court took judicial notice that a broad range of groups are 
cognizable,131 and it did not require proof that Thiel was prejudiced 
by the exclusion of daily wage earners from his jury. Similarly, the 
Court in Ballard needed no proof that women share attitudes or per-
spectives different from men; rather, it assumed that women are a 
cognizable group. 132 The marked difference in approach between 
these cases and later cases based on the Constitution may be attribut-
able to the source of the right. Comity and cautious constitutional 
interpretation might explain the more conservative approach to 
cognizability displayed in the later cases. 
By its requirement that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from [fed-
eral jury] service ... on account of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or economic status," 133 the federal Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968 apparently adopted the approach to 
cognizability of the federal supervisory power cases. The statute, 
however, has not led courts to interpret cognizability more liberally 
than in constitutional cases. 134 This conservatism is not easily ex-
plained. To be sure, not all potentially cognizable groups are pro-
tected from discrimination by section 1862 of the Act. Indeed, age 
groups are conspicuously absent. But courts have not interpreted 
that section as an exclusive enumeration of identifiable groups. 135 
The fair-cross-sectional right established in section 1861 amply sup-
ports a broad interpretation of cognizability. Moreover, its legisla-
tive history reveals that Congress intended to adopt the broad view 
of the cross-sectional right earlier expressed in Thiel and other su-
pervisory cases. 136 Thus, courts construing the federal statute should 
129. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
130. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
131. 328 U.S. at 220. 
132. 329 U.S. at 193-94. 
133. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, § 102, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976). 
134. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 591-93 (10th Cir. 1976). 
135. See Gewin, supra note 14, at 820-21. Section 1862 might be interpreted as expressing 
a congressional finding that the enumerated groups are cognizable, and as justifying a court in 
recognizing them by judicial notice. But it does not follow that courts should ignore proof that 
other, nonenumerated groups are cognizable. 
136. During the House debate many Congressmen supported the objective of obtaining a 
representative cross section injury pools. For instance, Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee, after citing Thiel, stated: "The basic aim of S. 989, as amended, is 
to assure that Federal grand and petit jurors are drawn at random from a representative cross 
section of the community and that all qualified citizens have an opportunity to be considered 
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remain faithful to the language and spirit of Thief and should recog-
nize all significant community social groups as cognizable. 
To recapitulate Part I, the right to a representative jury chosen 
from a fair cross section of the community is based on a variety of 
sources, both constitutional and statutory. By analyzing the underly-
ing purposes of the cross-sectional right, courts have identified a 
number of interests which it protects. These include the interest of 
criminal defendants and other litigants in a fair trial free from bias, 
the interests of members of all identifiable groups in equal participa-
tion in the administration of justice, and the interest of society as a 
whole in ensuring that disputes are resolved fairly. 
Courts have treated cognizability quite differently over the years. 
After the initial cognizability :finding in Strauder v. West 'Virginia, 137 
the courts did not discuss the issue again until the 1940s. The expan-
sive treatment of cognizability during that era appeared to end with 
Hernandez v. Texas. 138 Since then, courts often have been unwilling 
either to recognize formerly recognized groups or to expand the lim-
its of groups considered cognizable. Factors underlying this unwill-
ingness may include the courts' desire to limit the effects of the prima 
facie case doctrine, the courts' inability to use the equal protection 
clause with precision and flexibility, and the courts' failure to appre-
ciate the differences and scope of the sources of the cross-sectional 
right. 
II. COGNIZABILITY AS APPLIED TO YOUNG ADULTS 
Challenges to the underrepresentation of the young on juries pro-
liferated in the late 1960s and have not abated during the 1970s. 
They have been largely unsuccessful. In some instances, complain-
ants conceded at the outset that jury officials did not intentionally 
discriminate on the basis of age, and thus their claims failed. 139 
Challenges to the periodic emptying and refilling of the jury wheel in 
federal districts at specified intervals of four years or less140 also have 
been rejected, despite the inevitable, progressive exclusion of those 
for Federal jury service." 114 CONG. REC. 3990 (1968). The Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary stressed that "[a]jury chosen from a representative community sample is a fundamental of 
our system of justice." S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967). 
137. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
138. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
139. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1335 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 387 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 934 (1969). See text at note 13 supra. 
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1976). 
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aged 18-21 during each four-year cycle. 141 Moreover, the use of 
source lists on which the young are underrepresented has generally 
been upheld. 142 However, most challenges to the exclusion of young 
adults from juries have failed because courts refused to consider 
them cognizable. Like the recent cases concerning occupational, in-
come, and educational groups, these decisions have emphasized 
problems of group definition and the failure of complainants to 
prove that young adults share a distinct perspective which cannot be 
represented adequately by others. 
Fortunately, not all courts have denied the cognizability of the 
young. In People v. Bartlett, 143 the court assumed without discussion 
that young adults are a sufficiently large and identifiable group to be 
entitled to protection from discrimination, and it condemned jury 
selection practices which caused a gross underrepresentation of per-
sons aged eighteen to twenty-nine on petit jury panels.144 Similarly, 
in People v. Attica Brothers, 145 the court assumed that students are 
cognizable and ordered officials to revise the jury pool upon proof 
that students had been systematically and intentionally excluded 
from jury duty. 146 Other courts have recognized the cognizability of 
the young even more explicitly. The principal case is United States v. 
Butera. 147 In holding that young adults aged twenty-one to thirty-
four are cognizable, the court stated: 
[W]e [cannot] close our eyes to the contemporary national preoccupa-
tion with a "generation gap," which creates the impression that the 
attitudes of young adults are in some sense distinct from those of older 
adults. That apparent distinctness is sufficient for us to say that neither 
class could be excluded from jury pools without some justification. 148 
Another court, citing Butera, also found young adults cognizable 
141. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), approved the federal scheme on the 
ground that "some play in the joints of the jury-selection process is necessary in order to ac-
commodate the practical problems of judicial administration." 418 U.S. at 138. See also 
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); 
United States v. Ware, 473 F.2d 530,537 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 
1218 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 
145 (7th Cir. 1972). 
142. See note 8 supra. 
143. 89 Misc. 2d 874, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
144. 89 Misc. 2d at 881-83, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72. 
145. 79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
146. 79 Misc. 2d at 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 704. However, the court was more doubtful about 
the cognizability of young people. Without reaching the issue, the court ruled against com-
plainants because they failed to prove intentional discrimination against the young. 79 Misc. 
2d at 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
147. 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970). 
148. 420 F.2d at 570. Defendant's claim ultimately was rejected, however, because the 
court found that the key-man system under attack was reasonably designed to obtain a fair 
cross section for the jury pools in southern Maine, and that it was administered "without dis-
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and condemned automatic exemption of students because it caused 
substantial underrepresentation of young people on the jury rolls. 149 
Courts refusing to recognize young adults generally rely on the 
failure of the group to satisfy one or more of the cognizability crite-
ria articulated in United States v. Guzman: 
A group to be "cognizable" for present purposes must have a defi-
nite composition. That is, there must be some factor which defines and 
limits the group. A cognizable group is not one whose membership 
shifts from day to day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected. 
Secondly, the group must have cohesion. There must be a common 
thread which runs through the group, a basic similarity in attitudes or 
ideas or experience which is present in members of the group and 
which cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from 
the jury selection process. Finally, there must be a possibility that ex-
clusion of the group will result in partiality or bias on the part of juries 
hearing cases in which group members are involved. That is, the group 
must have a community of interest which cannot be adequately pro-
tected by the rest of the populace. 150 
Thus, United States v. Ross151 reasoned that the refusal to hold 
the young cognizable was ''justified in light of the fact that the pa-
rameters of such a group are difficult to ascertain, as evidenced by 
the widely varying ages which have been used to define it."152 Some 
courts have declined to recognize age groups spanning only a few 
years because it was not shown that persons in the designated groups 
share distinct views. In United States v. Kuhn, 153 for example, de-
fendant challenged the systematic exclusion of persons aged twenty-
one to twenty-three from jury service. The Court held: "There is 
nothing identifiable or distinctive about young adults in the age 
range of 21 to 23 to set them apart from young adults aged 23 and 
cernible discrimination against any group." 420 F.2d at 574. The court thus concluded that 
the government had rebutted the defendant's prima facie case. 420 F.2d at 574 n.24. 
149. People v. Marr, 67 Misc. 2d 113,117,324 N.Y.S.2d 608,613 (Just. Ct. 1971). See also 
People v. Fujita, 43 Cal. App. 3d 454, 475-76, 117 Cal. Rptr. 757, 770 (1974); Julian v. State, 
135 Ga. App. 592, 215 S.E.2d 496 (1975); Paciona v. Marshall, 45 App. Div. 2d 462, 359 
N.Y.S.2d 360, affd., 35 N.Y.2d 289, 319 N.E.2d 199, 360 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1974); State v. Hol-
strom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 470-73, 168 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1969). 
150. 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 937 (1973). Employing these criteria, the court found that none of the groups de-
scribed by complainants-IS- to 21-year-olds, 24- to 30-year-olds, and "younger persons" in 
general-were cognizable. 337 F. Supp. at 145-46. 
151. 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973). 
152. 468 F.2d at 1217. See also Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 144 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Guzman, 
337 F. Supp. 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 
(1973). 
153. 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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over who were eligible for jury duty at the time in question." 154 
Claims of discrimination against age groups spanning more years 
have often been rejected for similar failures of proof. For example, 
United States ex rel Chestnut v. Criminal Court 155 sustained grand 
jury selection procedures that operated to exclude all people under 
thirty-five because "[p]etitioners here have presented no factual data 
of any sort, tentative or otherwise, to support their suspicion of parti-
ality" against defendants. 156 The Court also found "no apparent 
ground for assuming that a grand jury deficient in the various under-
represented groups would be unduly sympathetic to the prosecu-
tor." 157 Similarly, the court in Quadra v. Superior Court declined to 
follow Butera in taking judicial notice of cognizability; it dismissed a 
claim on behalf of young adults aged twenty-one to forty because 
plaintiffs offered no proof that the group was distinct and identifi-
able.158 Finally, many courts denying the cognizability of the young 
object that inevitably there are differences as well as similarities 
among members of the group.1s9 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether young adults are 
an identifiable group for jury selection purposes, 160 nor has the 
154. 441 F.2d at 181. Similarly, United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (81h Cir.), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973), held that complainants failed to show that Ihe altitudes of lhe 18-
to 20-year-old age group were inadequately represented by those several years older than they. 
473 F.2d at 688. See also United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); King v. 
United States, 346 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v. Deardorff, 343 F. Supp. 1033, 1043 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y.), a.ffd, 468 F.2d 
1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st 
Cir. 1970), which held young adults aged 21-34 cognizable, often is distinguished in cases 
reviewing two- to four-year age groups on the ground that the age group in Butera was much 
larger and thus more stable and identifiable. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d at 1217 
n.4. 
155. 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). 
156. 442 F.2d at 616 n.9. 
157. 442 F.2d at 616. 
158. 378 F. Supp. 605, 622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 
1310, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976); United States v. Briggs, 366 
F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145-46 
(S.D.N.Y.), a.ffd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 944 (1974); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245, 1247 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973). 
160. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), assumed without reaching the issue that 
the young are a cognizable group and found that the petitioners had failed to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination against young adults aged 18-24. 418 U.S. at 135-38. The Court 
did appear skeptical of their cognizability: 
Petitioners do not cite case authority for the proposition that the young are an identifi-
able group entitled to a group-based protection under our prior cases, see [Hernandez]; 
claims of exclusion of the young from juries have met with liltle success in the federal 
courts. 
418 U.S. at 137 (citation and footnote omiued). And the Court seemed to assume that a pur-
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.Court defined precisely the general standards for determining 
cognizability. The criteria of cognizability set forth in Guzman are 
essentially those developed by the lower courts over the years. How-
ever, they should not be applied either uncritically or too stringently, 
as some courts have done. The first criterion of Guzman, that a 
group have a definite composition and not be arbitrarily defined, is 
troublesome. Although the criterion has some validity, 161 in apply-
ing it courts often have ignored the fact that society must draw many 
lines which are somewhat arbitrary. The second criterion, that the 
group be cohesive and have basically similar attitudes, ideas, and 
experiences, is more acceptable. However, this criterion should not 
be misinterpreted as requiring complete uniformity within the 
group. 162 As several members of the Court reasoned in Peters v. Ktff, 
"It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consis-
tently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion 
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have 
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented."163 
The third criterion states as a requirement that exclusion of the 
group might cause juries to be biased against a defendant from that 
group. This is a sufficient but not necessary condition of 
cognizability, for the Supreme Court has clearly held that defendants 
who do not belong to a group nonetheless have standing to object to 
its exclusion from the jury under both the sixth amendment 164 and 
the equal protection clause. 165 Moreover, this criterion and the sec-
poseful discrimination against the young must be shown. 418 U.S. at 137. However, the opin-
ion offers only a very cursory discussion of the age-discrimination claim; the predominant 
issue before the sharply divided Court was the constitutional validity of an obscenity prosecu-
tion. 
Earlier in the same term that Hamling was decided, several members of the Court were in 
favor of hearing a defendant's contention that women and young adults aged 18-30 were sys-
tematically and purposefully excluded from grand and petit jury venires. The defendant had 
asserted that proof of underrepresentation and of an opportunity to discriminate should estab-
lish a prima facie case, as in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), a racial discrimina-
tion case. The Justices responded: 
Though Alexander involved racial discrimination, appellant's contention certainly 
presents a substantial question whether the principles of that decision should apr.ly where 
any large, identifiable segment of the co=unity is arbitrarily or discriminatonly under-
represented on the jury venire. 
White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886,890 (1973) (Brennan, J.,joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting from dismissal of appeal). 
161. See text at notes 169-71 iefra. 
162. Unfortunately, some courts have indicated at least partial agreement with such an 
interpretation. See cases cited in note 159 supra. 
163. 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.,joined by Douglas and Stewart, 
JJ.), approvingly noted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975). 
164. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975). 
165. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
1072 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:1045 
ond criterion should not be applied conjunctively, as Guzman sug-
gests, but disjunctively. Either a finding that members of an age 
group share common ideas or experiences which cannot be repre-
sented adequately in their absence or that possible partiality or bias 
against a defendant if members of his age group are excluded war-
rant a designation of cognizability if the first criterion is also satis-
fied. 
Ill. EsTABLISHING THE COGNIZABILITY OF YOUNG ADULTS 166 
As Part II has shown, problems of group definition and failure of 
proof have been the two main obstacles to the cognizability of young 
adults. The following discussion will demonstrate that these obsta-
cles can be surmounted. Although courts may be correct in refusing 
to recognize age groups spanning only a few years, their refusal to 
recognize larger age groups is unreasonable. Moreover, the courts' 
unwillingness to assume that young adults have attitudes, ideas, and 
experiences different from those of their elders and that young crimi-
nal defendants may be prejudiced by the absence of their peers on 
juries can and should be overcome with proof of these facts. 
A. .Defining Young Adults 
Administratively convenient definitions of "young adults" can be 
written. It is easy to tell whether a person is a member of a group 
aged eighteen to thirty, for example, because age itself both defines 
and limits the group. Although the group's composition changes 
with the passage of time, the change is slight from year to year, and 
that gradual change is not significantly greater than the change in 
racial or gender groups through disqualification from service, use of 
exemptions, or movement into or out of a jurisdiction. 
The boundaries of an age group are indeed somewhat arbitrary 
and often could be altered slightly without noticeably changing the 
group character. Society draws many lines by age which are some-
166. The discussion and data presented in the remainder of the Article strongly support the 
conclusion that older age groups as well as younger age groups are cognizable. Federal law 
and the laws of most states do not impose upper age limits on jury service, and persons over 
age 65 apparently are substantially underrepresented on the jury rolls in most jurisdictions. 
See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 35-39, 258-70 app. A, 332-47 app. H. The complete absence 
of challenges to underrepresentation of the elderly probably stems from the fact that older 
jurors are more conservative and tend to have a stronger law and order orientation than 
younger jurors. Since criminal defendants bring most challenges to selection procedures, 
challenges to the underrepresentation of the elderly probably seem counter-productive. 
Underrepresentation of young adults is even greater than underrepresentation of the elderly in 
most jurisdictions, J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 332 app. H, and the issue is approached here 
from the perspective of the young. 
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what arbitrary, however. It surely does not follow that we would be 
better off drawing no line at all. 167 Here, if it is clearly shown that 
young adults generally have different attitudes from their elders, and 
if the location of the boundary between them can be roughly indi-
cated, then it hardly seems sensible to deny the group's cognizability 
simply because any boundary drawn in that range will be as rational 
as any other. Such reasoning apparently persuaded the court in 
Butera. While conceding that young adults were an "ill-de.fined" 
group, the court stated: ''We cannot allow the requirement of a 'dis-
tinct' group to be applied so stringently with regard to age grouping 
that possible discrimination against a large class of persons-in our 
case, t~ose between twenty-one and thirty-four-will be insulated 
from attack."168 
At the root of judicial concern about group definition might be 
the fear that if young adults are recognized as cognizable, age groups 
with short time spans must also be recognized. 169 But that conclu-
sion does not follow from the premise. People perceive themselves, 
and are perceived by others, as members of broad age categories-as 
young adults, middle-aged, or elderly-not, for example, as twenty-
one to twenty-three year olds.170 An age group of only two or three 
years span will differ little in attitude from a similarly narrow group 
of the same span which is just older than the first, or just younger. 
The kind of proof of attitude examined in the next section will sim-
ply not be available for groups spanning less than approximately ten 
years. Consequently, the fear that recognizing young adults will 
open the floodgates to challenges by narrow age groups is unwar-
ranted.171 , 
167. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Supreme 
Court upheld a statute requiring that state police retire at age 50, despite the age limit's inevi-
table arbitrariness. The Court stated, "(T]he drawing of lines that create distinctions is ... 
unavoidable. . . . Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor 
necessary." 427 U.S. at 314. Since physical fitness generally declines with age, the Court 
found that the Massachusetts requirement was rationally related to the legitimate state objec-
tive of assuring the physical preparedness of its police officers. 427 U.S. at 314-15. 
If courts endorse, as they must and do, somewhat arbitrary age limitations which impose 
substantial hardships on persons in certain age groups, they should also be willing to endorse a 
somewhat arbitrary definition of young adults for jury selection purposes which imposes hard-
ships on no one. 
168. 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970). 
169. See cases cited in notes 153-54 supra. 
170. See Part III. B infra. 
171. Apparently similar to the problem of defining the contours of a cognizable age group 
is the problem of determining the minimum age requirement for jury service. These issues are 
distinct, however. As note 167 supra suggests, the first issue is whether the judiciary should 
employ an inevitably arbitrary measure to protect constitutional rights; the second is whether 
the state constitutionally may employ such a measure to protect its interest in choosing mature, 
responsible jurors. 
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B. Age as a .Determinant of Attitude 
It has become a social scientists' truism that the young share 
common and distinct attitudes. The social scientist's evidence speaks 
to all the traditional criteria of cognizability. That evidence supple-
ments the above argument that "the young" are easily defined, and 
the presence of common attitudes suggests that the young are "cohe-
sive." Finally, the evidence provides a basis for the inference that 
the attitudes of the young differ sufficiently from those of the rest of 
the population that excluding the young from juries would adversely 
affect the quality of deliberation. 
Age crucially influences people's thoughts and acts: 
Age, in Mannheim's insightful formulation, "locates" individuals in 
the social structure. There is much evidence that, for example, a per-
son's activities, his attitudes toward life, his relationships to his family 
or to his work-as well as his biological capacities and his physical 
fitness-are all conditioned by his position in the age structure of the 
particular society in which he lives.172 
Age differences in society are not random; they are patterned and 
systematic. Indeed, "age operates as a basis of social stratification 
much like class"173 and divides our society into three broad, post-
childhood segments: the young, middle-aged and aged. 174 In addi-
tion, 
age orders both people and roles. Not only is the population ranked 
according to age, but social roles, with their differing rewards, are de-
fined in terms of age and age-related criteria. The result is the forma-
Aside from this line-drawing problem, minimum age requirements might appear to under-
mine the thesis that the young are cognizable. If the very young can be excluded from jury 
service entirely, why may not the state employ selection procedures which merely under-
represent those slightly older? Is it not a paradox that a state which gives 18- to 21-year-olds 
the legal right to serve might be forbidden from systematically excluding them, even though 
another state might be permitted to deny the same group the right to serve? 
This paradox can be explained by an analogy to another important citizenship right, the 
right to vote. Although a state might constitutionally deny the vote to 17-year-olds, it could 
not grant them the vote conditionally by, for instance, imposing a poll tax. Similarly, once the 
state has announced that a class of persons deserves to serve on juries, it cannot allow capri-
cious devices that effectively cancel their right to serve. Government integrity demands that 
citizenship rights be granted fully or not at all. 
In large part, the paradox is only of theoretical interest. Since the minimum age for jury 
service probably could not be constitutionally raised much above the age of 21, and since the 
age group 21-30 is sufficiently large and distinct to be cognizable, the underrepresentation of 
young people can still be successfully challenged. 
172. 3M. RILEY, M. JOHNSON & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY 398 (1972) (hereinafter 
cited as AGING AND SOCIETY 1972). See also Foner, Age in Society: Structure and C/Jange, 
19 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 144, 148 (1975). 
173. Foner, supra note 172, at 145; see I M. RILEY & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as AGING AND SOCIETY 1968]. 
174. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 2; AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra 
note 172, at 420. 
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tion of age strata distinguished from one another because their 
members differ in age or life stage and in access to roles which are 
unequally rewarded by wealth, prestige, or power.175 
Age stratification has become more important in our society. In 
the nineteenth century, 
the boundaries between age strata were not so clearly defined, and 
there was a good deal more age heterogeneity in-social life than there is 
today. But in the modem period, with the great complexity of social 
organizations and the high degree of bureaucratization, age has in-
creasingly become an important criterion for social differentiation and 
inequality.176 
Today the differences associated with age are ubiq:uitous. Age 
groups differ in "labor force participation, consumer behavior, lei-
sure-time activities, ip.arital status, religious behavior, education, na-
tivity, fertility, child-rearing practices, .political attitudes-to name 
only a few." 177 Moreover, "[o]lder people differ sharply from 
younger people in many of their opinions, feelings, and dispositions 
toward such central aspects of life as health, personal p;roblems, or 
death." 178 The old l;llso tend to be more politically .conservative, 
more resistant to change, and less tolerant .of politicaJ and social 
nonconformists than the young. 179 "It comes as no surprise, then, 
that each age strata has its own distinctive subculture."1_80 
An examination of the causes of age-group differences demon-
strates how and w:hy those groups form recognizable social catego-
ries with fairly well-defined boundaries. First, at any given period 
members of an age stratum belong to the same birth cohort, "[e]ach 
cohort [having] unique characteristics because of the particular his-
torical events it has undergone, [and] the particular knowledge and 
attitudes it has acquired in childhood .... " 181 Cohesion in each co-
hort is fostered by a "homogeneity in values and beliefs (about what 
is good, beautiful or true) among individuals who were educated at 
175. Foner, supra note 172, at 147 (references omitted); see AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, 
supra note 173, at 410-12. 
176. Affidavit of Dr. Anne Foner at 15, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN (E.D. N.Y., 
filed Aug. 3, 1973) (submitted as direct testimony). In that case, the systematic exclusion of 
those aged 18-30 from grand jury service in Queens County, New York, was challenged. See 
also Neugarten & Hagestad, Age and the L!fe Course, in HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 35, 45, 52 (R. Binstock & E. Shanas eds. 1976). 
177. AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 420. 
178. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 315. See aiso AGING AND SOCIETY 
1972, supra note 172, at 431. 
179. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 5, 473 . .See AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, 
supra note 172, at 115-19, 132-34. 
180. AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 420 (emphasis original). 
181. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 3. See also Foner, supra note 172, at 
151; AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 4, 418-19, 432-33. 
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the same point in history.';182 Conversely, differences in life stage 
and experience may engender hostility and conflict between age 
strata.183 
A second factor making for distinct age groups is the commonali-
ties of life stage shared.by group members. 
Like persons within a class, individuals of similar age at any one pe-
riod have common opportunities to fill valued roles. They share the 
joys and pains of current life tasks. Because they are at the same stage 
of their life course, they resemble one another in biological develop-
ment and in the role sequences and role transitions they have exper-
ienced.184 
The extensive age segregation in the United States further pro-
motes solidarity between those of the same age and insulates mem-
bers of one group from members of another. Age segregation is 
common in education, employment, and residency. Face-to-face 
contact within age strata reinforces similar ideas and attitudes, while 
often allowing members of one stratum to remain unaware of or un-
sympathetic to the ideas of other strata. 185 
The sociological findings on the importance of age in determin-
ing attitudes go to the essence of cognizability. The unique perspec-
tives and shared experiences of young adults simply cannot be 
represented adequately by their elders. Because age groups differ in 
varied and subtle ways, underrepresentation of the young on juries 
inevitably diminishes the interplay of ideas and viewpoints during 
deliberations. As when women are absent, "a flavor, a distinct quali-
ty is lost"186 if young adults are seriously underrepresented on jury 
rolls. 
IV. ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN 
JURY DELIBERATIONS 
The evidence presented above permits the inference that the 
young meet the third criterion of _cognizability-that their attitudes 
are so different from those of the rest of the population that the qual-
ity of a jury's deliberation would be significantly affected by the ab-
182. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 5. See also Foner, supra note 172, at 
151. 
183. Waring & Riley, Age and Aging, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 363 (4th ed. 
R. Merton & R. Nisbet 1976). See also Foner, supra note 172, at 153-54; AGING AND SOCIETY 
1972, supra note 172, at 145, 442-48. 
184. Foner, supra note 172, at 150-51. 
185. See generally Foner, supra note 172, at 151; Waring & Riley, supra note 183, at 377-
79. 
186. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946). 
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sence of the young. However, since the evidence is inferential only, 
this Article presents the results of a survey which speaks directly to 
the question whether excluding the young would affect the nature of 
a jury's discussions and decisions. The results of this survey are es-
pecially significant in that such specific proof has apparently never 
been presented in discussions of cognizability. 
The survey was conducted in Queens County, New York. 187 It 
reveals consistent and significant differences in attitudes among per-
sons in different age groups on matters crucial to jury deliberations. 
The greatest disparities in attitudes are those between the youngest 
(18-30) and oldest (61-75). The data also show that the correlations 
between attitudes and age are much greater than the correlations be-
tween attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income. Since racial 
groups, women, and on occasion, occupational and income groups, 
have been held cognizable, young adults are cognizable a fortiori. 
A. Methodology 188 
The survey was specifically designed to elicit attitudes concerning 
the workings of the criminal justice system and service on petit and 
grand juries. The questionnaire contained twenty-one opinion state-
ments189 and requested demographic information. Systematically 
187. The results of the survey were submitted at trial in Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 
1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973), in support of the plaintiffs' challenge to the exclusion 
of the young from grand jury service in that county. 
For a comparison of the demographic characteristics of Queens County and the United 
States as a whole, see Appendix D iefra. 
188. Appendix A iefra describes in greater detail the methodology of the survey. 
189. A copy of the full questionnaire may be found in Appendix A (Exhibit I). The 21 
opinion statements (numbered as on the questionnaire) are as follows: 
I. It is better to let some guilty people go free rather than risk sending innocent people to 
jail. 
2. Police should not hesitate to use force to maintain order. 
3. Capital punishment is more effective than a life sentence in keeping people from com-
mitting murder. 
4. The courts allow young people to get away with too much too easily. 
5. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious lo9king persons to deter-
mine whether they have been up to something illegal. 
6. A witness who takes the fifth amendment i~ probably hiding his or her guilt of a 
crime. 
7. Police will often lie to cover up for one another. 
8. In tough situations older people almost always make wiser decisions than younger 
people. · 
9. Young people have less respect for law than older people. 
10. A person accused of several different crimes is probably guilty of at least one of 
them. 
11. The police don't make arrests unless they have good reason to believe that a crime 
has been committed. 
12. Too often, the government brings people to trial who are not really guilty. 
13. Obedience to authority is the most important virtue children should learn. 
14. In criminal cases the judge instructs the jury that the defendant must be considered 
innocent unless proven guilty. However, many people think that a defendant has the 
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chosen samples of those on the petit and grand jury rolls and of 
members of the general public were contacted by telephone, and 579 
interviews were completed. For all but three statements, respondents 
were asked to tell the interviewer whether they agreed strongly, 
agreed somewhat, disagreed somewhat, or disagreed strongly with 
the statement read to them. For convenience, the "agree strongly" 
and "agree somewhat" responses are combined in the presentation 
below.190 Three statistical procedures were used to analyze the sur-
vey data: tables of percentages, Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients, and standardized multiple regression coefficients. Each 
is explained in context. 
B. The Findings 
1. The Relationship Between Age and Attitudes 
The survey results demonstrate significant correlations between 
age and attitudes among the groups sampled.191 Since space con-
straints prohibit a discussion of all twenty-one statements, only six 
statements are discussed. However, the responses are representative 
of the responses by age for all twenty-one statements. 192 
Statement 6 was: "A witness who takes the fifth amendment is prob-
responsibility to prove his or her innocence. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal 
case, would you follow the judge's instructions or would you want the defendant to prove 
innocence? 
15. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case and truly believed that the person 
on trial was guilty but the evidence didn't prove it, would you vote to find the person 
guilty or not guilty? 
19. If a District Attorney strongly recommends an indictment grand jurors should go 
along with the recomme.Qdation. 
20. Grand jurors rarely need to exercise their right to ask questions of witnesses because 
they can rely on the District Attorney to ask all necessary questions. 
21. During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the jurors that 
person should change his or her vote to go along with the majority. 
22. Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the evidence, the grand jury should 
always follow his recommendations. 
23. District Attorneys sometimes conceal evidence from a grand jury in order to get an 
indictment. , 
24. Do you think Society would be better served if the grand jury represented all seg-
ments of the community or if it was composed of older, more experienced people? 
Questions 16 through 18 are omitted here and in the analysis of results because they were 
designed to probe the respondent's understanding of a grand jury, not to elicit an opinion. 
190. The percentage disagreeing with the statement in each group may be determined by 
subtracting the percentage listed in the tables from 100%. 
191. Of the three groups sampled, 10% of the general public had served on a petit jury, 58% 
of those from the petit jury pool had served on a petit jury, and 60% of those from the grand 
jury pool had served on a grand jury. Data runs were conducted controlling for the fact of 
service as to all 21 opinion statements. The results showed vjrtually no differences in opinion 
between those who had served and those who had not served on juries. Thus, it can be inferred 
that jury service does little to modify one's attitudes, at least as to the issues probed in this 
survey. 
192. Appendix C iefra gives a complete set of percentage tabulations for all the demo-
graphic variables--age, race, sex, occupation, and income. 
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ably hiding his or her guilt of a crime." Table 1 shows the percentage 
agreeing with this statement by age and sample. I93 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 6 BY AGE 
Statement 6: "A witness who takes the fifth amendment is probably hiding his or her 
guilt of a crime." 
Age 
Level of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff.194 Significance 
General Public 39 59 64 74 +35 .01 
Petit Jurors 33 50 52 80 +47 .001 
Grand Jurors 12 13 38 84 +72 .001 
In all three samples, younger people agreed with Statement 6 
much less frequently than older people. Moreover, there is a clear 
trend in each sample of increasing agreement from the youngest to 
the oldest age groups. And in all three samples, the difference in 
attitude is greatest between the youngest and the oldest groups. In 
the grand juror sample, the difference is an unusually large seventy-
two percent. The responses to Statement 6 suggest that if young 
adults are absent from jury rolls, the right to invoke the fifth amend-
ment may not be fully recognized. 
The ninth statement read to those surveyed was: "Young people 
have less respect for law than older people'." Table 2 shows the per-
centages agreeing with this statement in each age group in the three 
samples. 
The data in Table 2 show the same general patterns as the data in 
Table 1. Older people agreed with the statement much more fre-
quently than younger people, and there is a clear trend in each sam-
ple of increasing agreement from the youngest to the oldest groups. 
Further, in the general public and petit juror samples, the difference 
in attitude is greatest between the youngest and the oldest. 
193. On the average for all statements, less than 5% of those surveyed were unable or 
unwilling to give an opinion. This low rate indicate~ that the statements were meaningful and 
clear to those surveyed. 
194. The percentage differences listed are the differences between the left-most and right-
most categories of the social characteristic. The level of significance is .0 l for the general 
public sample, using the chi-square (x2) test. This indicates that there is only one chance in 
one hundred that the observed relationship (+35% difference) could have occurred in the sam-
ple solely as a result of sampling error (i.e., without the relationship existing in the population 
from which the sample was drawn). Note that lower levels of significance are better, i.e., 
indicate lower probabilities of sampling error. Stronger relationships (higher percent differ-
ences) and larger sample sizes each contribute to statistical significance and to greater sample 
reliability. For a discussion of chi-square and other tests of statistical significance, see W. 
WYATT & C. BRIDGES, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1967). 
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TABLE 2 . 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 9 BY AGE 
Statement 9: "Young people have less respect for law than older people." 
Age 
Level·of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 48 62 63 90 +42 .01 
Petit Jurors 42 63 80 80 +38 .001 
Grand Jurors 38 37 55 86 +48 .01 
In addition to Statement 9, Statements 4, 8, and 24 raise issues 
dealing explicitly with age. The responses are only slightly less strik-
ing than those recorded for Statement 9. 195 These results suggest an 
underlying pattern of hostility toward the young among older peo-
ple, some of whom might presume that young people accused of 
crime are ipso facto guilty. Thus, a jury on which young adults are 
underrepresented might be less likely to accord a young defendant 
the full presumption of innocence. 196 Because most persons accused 
of crime are under thirty, 197 the nearly universal underrepresentation 
of the youngest age group on jury rolls poses a danger of age bias in 
most criminal cases. 
The tenth statement read: "A person accused of several d!!ferent 
crimes is probably guilty of at least one of them." Table 3 shows the 
percentages of people who agreed with this statement in each age 
group in the three samples. 
TABLE 3 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 10 BY AGE 
Statement 10: "A person accused of several different crimes is probably guilty of al 
least one of them." 
Age 
Level of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 53 44 63 83 +30 .01 
Petit Jurors 38 54 60 77 +39 .05 
Grand Jurors 41 28 37 66 +25 .05 
195. See Appendix C infra. 
196. Statement 14, printed in note 189 supra, explicitly probes attitudes toward the pre-
sumption of innocence. Although the responses are less striking than the responses to State-
ments 4, 8, 9, and 24, see Appendix C infra, they are consistent with the conclusion that the 
underrepresentation of young adults might result injuries which undervalue that presumption. 
197. In 1974, for example, 27.2% of all the persons arrested in the United States were under 
age 18, and 41.6% were between the ages of 18 and 29. Persons over age 30, by contrast, 
constituted only 31% of those arrested. M. HINDELANG, M. GoTIFREDSON, C. DUNN & N. 
PARISI, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1976, at 528-29 table 4.4 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS]. 
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In general, older people agreed with this statement much more 
often than younger people. In this instance, however, the results do 
not show a consistent trend of increasing agreement from the young-
est to the oldest groups in the general public and grand juror sam-
ples. As in the previous examples, however, the differences in 
attitude between the youngest and the oldest age groups are great. 
In the sample of the general public, thirty percent more of those in 
the sixty-one to seventy-five age group agreed with the statement 
than those in the eighteen to thirty age group, and the differences 
between these age groups in the petit juror and grand juror samples 
were thirty-nine and twenty-five percentage points respectively. 
The first statement was: "It is better to let some guilty people go 
free rather than risk sending innocent people to jail." Table 4 shows 
the percentage in each group in each sample who disagreed198 with 
this statement. 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE DISAGREEING WITH STATEMENT 1 BY AGE 
Statement I: "It is better to let some guilty people go free rather than risk sending 
innocent people to jail." 
Age 
Level of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 48 38 48 64 +16 .20 
Petit Jurors 49 55 45 62 +13 Not Sig. 
Grand Jurors 44 36 36 42 -2 Not Sig. 
Statement 1 is one of a few of the twenty-one opinion statements 
for which there is not a clear and striking relationship between age 
and attitude. 199 In the general public and petit juror samples, older 
people were somewhat more likely than younger people to disagree 
and, once again, the greatest differences were between the youngest 
( or next youngest) and oldest age groups. However, there is not a 
consistent trend of increasing disagreement from the youngest to the 
198. Statement I was one of four statements which were phrased in a "liberal" rather than 
a "conservative" manner. The other "liberal" statements are 7, 12, and 23. See note 189 
supra. Generally, the responses to these items tended to be the opposite of the responses to the 
statements phrased conservatively; that is, younger people more often agreed and older people 
more often disagreed with these statements. Percentages for those who disagreed with the 
statements are listed to make the complete set of percentages tabulated in Appendix C more 
readable. 
199. Other statements for which the relationship between age and attitude is rather weak 
are Statements 7 and 12,printed in note 189 supra. A stronger but still less than striking rela-
tionship is exhibited for Statements 14, 15, 19, and 23, printed in note 189 supra. 
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oldest groups. Moreover, in the grand juror sample, the maximum 
difference between any two age groups was only eight percent. 
Questionnaire statements 19-24 were designed to elicit attitudes 
toward grand jury matters directly. For example, Statement 21 was: 
".During deliberations, ff one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the 
jurors, that person should change his or her vote to go along with the 
majority." Table 5 shows the percentages who agreed with the state-
ment in each age group and sample. 
TABLE 5 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 21 BY AGE 
Statement 21: "During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the 
jurors, that person should change his or her vote to go along with the majority." 
Age 
Level of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 7 7 8 33 +26 .01 
Petit Jurors 2 9 13 18 +16 .15 
Grand Jurors 0 0 3 25 +25 .01 
A clear relationship between age and attitude is exhibited by the 
responses in all three samples-Le., older people agreed with the 
statement more often than younger people. Furthermore, there is a 
clear trend of increasing agreement from the youngest to the oldest 
groups in all samples. The responses of those in the oldest age group 
were markedly different from the responses of those in the other age 
groups. 
The responses to Statement 22 were very similar to the responses 
to Statement 21. Statement 22 was: "Since the .District Attorney is 
more familiar with the evidence, the grand jury should always follow lzis 
recommendations." The percentages agreeing by age and sample are 
listed in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 22 BY AGE 
Statement 22: "Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the evidence, the 
grand jury should always follow his reco=endations." 
Age 
Level of 
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 13 18 28 66 +53 .001 
Petit Jurors 10 9 20 37 +27 .001 
.Grand Jurors 6 0 9 28 +22 .10 
Once again, older people agreed with the statement much more 
June 1978] Young Adults as a Cognizable Group 1083 
often than younger people. The pattern of increasing agreement by 
age is repeated for the most part. Finally, the differences in attitude 
in each sample between the youngest and oldest groups were large. 
In the general public sample, the difference in response between 
these groups was a substantial fifty-three percentage points. 
The responses to Statements 21 and 22, as well as the responses 
to the other statements concerning grand jury service,200 suggest that 
people between the ages of eighteen and thirty are more likely to be 
inclined to exercise independent judgment than are older people, es-
pecially those between the ages of sixty-one and seventy-five. Grand 
juries on which young adults are substantially underrepresented thus 
may be much more inclined to act as a rubber stamp for the prosecu-
tor than grand juries on which the young are properly represented. 
In sum, these data documenting the relationship between age and 
attitude on matters of importance in jury deliberations support the 
conclusion that young adults are cognizable. The data show clear 
and consistent differences of opinion by age on such matters as the 
inference of guilt from silence, the presumption of innocence, the 
predisposition of the young to break the law, the performance and 
prerogatives of the police,201 and the role of the grand juror vis-a-vis 
the district attorney. These results go to the heart of cognizability. 
They demonstrate that the young have cohesive, distinct attitudes on 
issues directly relevant to a jury's deliberations. Furthermore, they 
demonstrate that permitting underrepresentation of the young on ju-
ries would be especially unfortunate, since the attitudes of the young 
tend to be more congruent than those of the old with the values 
which inform our legal system. Thus underrepresentation of the 
young increases the risk of several kinds of jury bias, especially bias 
against young criminal defendants.202 
200. See Appendix C infra, Statements 19-24. 
201. In addition to Statement 10, discussed in text following note 197 supra, see Statements 
2, 5, 7, and 11, printed in note 189 supra. 
202. Other data are consistent with those presented above. The responses to the questions 
concerning criminal justice issues presented in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, supra note 197, show a significant relationship between age and attitude. Perceptions of 
personal safety differ according to age. Fifty-two percent of those aged 20-24 said they felt 
''very" safe about being out alone in their neighborhood during the day, while only 41% of 
those aged 50-64 and only 31% of those above age 65 said they felt ''very" safe. Id. at 304 table 
2.8. Correspondingly, younger people are less likely than older people to think law enforce-
ment agencies should be tougher than they are now in dealing with crime and lawlessness. 
Only 66% of the persons aged 18-20 favored tougher enforcement, while 85% of those aged 50 
and over held that opinion. Id. at 316 table 2.29. Older people were more likely to favor the 
death penalty and less likely to favor legalization of marijuana than younger people. Id. at 
327 table 2.61, 342 table 2.91. 
A similar relationship between age and attitude concerning criminal justice issues was 
found in a .Detroit Free Press survey of 500 jurors in 1970. Oppedahl, The Generational Gap in 
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2. Comparison of the Correlations Between Attitudes and Age with 
the Correlations Between Attitudes and Race, Sex, 
Occupation, and Income 
The survey results provide important additional support for the 
cognizability of the young, since they reveal that the correlations be-
tween attitudes and age are stronger than the correlations between 
attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income. 
a. Correlation analysis. The percentage table method of analy-
sis used in the discussion of age and attitudes is too unwieldy to use 
in analyzing all the demographic variables. Instead, Pearson prod-
uct-moment correlation coefficients are used.203 Five tables of per-
centages and a corresponding table of correlations are presented for 
one opinion statement so that the reader may understand fully the 
manner in which correlation coefficients summarize the data. 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, symbolized 
by r, summarizes the relationship between two variables (e.g., age 
and attitude) in a single number. This coefficient ranges from -1.0 
to + 1.0. The sign of the coefficient indicates the nature of the rela-
tionship between the social characteristic and the opinion statement. 
In the context of this survey, positive correlations mean that older 
people, nonwhites, females, persons with higher occupational status, 
and persons with higher incomes more often agree with the state-
ment. If the sign is negative, younger people, whites, males, persons 
with lower occupational status, and persons with lower incomes 
more often agree with the statement. The closer r is to 1.0, whether 
positive or negative, the stronger the relationship between the demo-
graphic variable and the attitude. A large r thus corresponds to a 
large difference in percentages. 204 If the value of r is zero or close to 
zero, there is little or no consistent relationship between the demo-
graphic variable and the attitude, corresponding to little or no differ-
ence in the percentages. 
Court, Detroit Free Press, July 26, 1971, § A, at I, col. 2. The results of the survey are 
presented in part in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 37-38. See also Ginger & Powers, Missis-
sippi Juror Age Requirement-Unfair to the .Defendant, U'!fair to the Young, and Uefair to t//e 
Public-Is It Constitutional?, 41 MISS. L.J. I (1976). 
203. For an explanation of this statistical technique, see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 
285-99 (1960). 
204. The value of r does not correspond only to the percentage difference between the 
extreme categories of the demographic variable (here, young adults vs. the aged), it accounts 
for the percentage differences between all categories, including intermediate ones (here, those 
aged 31-45 and 46-60). One mark of the sophistication of correlation analysis is this ability to 
explain a statistical trend along an entire spectrum of categories. For an illustration, see text al 
note 206 infra. 
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The percentages of people in each of .the three samples who 
agreed with Statement 6 ("A witness who takes the fifth amendment is 
probably hiding his or her guilt of a crime.") by age, race, sex, occupa-
tion and income are shown in Table 7. The correlation coefficients 
summarizing these data are shown in part F of Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 6 BY AGE, RACE, SEX, 
OCCUPATION AND INCOME, AND CORRESPONDING CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENTS 
Statement 6: "A witness who takes the fifth amendment is probably hiding his or her 
guilt of a crime." 
Sample 
General Public 
Petit Jurors 
Grand Jurors 
Sample 
General Public 
Petit Jurors 
Grand Jurors 
Sample 
General Public 
Petit Jurors 
Grand Jurors 
Sample 
General Public 58 
Petit Jurors 78 
Grand Jurors 74 
A. Age 
Level of 
18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Signigicance 
39 
33 
12 
59 
50 
13 
White 
58 
56 
55 
Male 
54 
57 
54 
64 
52 
38 
B. Race 
74 
80 
84 
Nonwhite 
C. Sex 
58 
54 
66 
Female 
62 
58 
63 
D. Occupation 
"'~ ., ., 
> ... 
·- 0 E~ 
8.,--l 
O"<l 
64 75 
64 54 
100 70 
.; 
-~ ., 
0 
48 56 
63 65 
69 74 
82 
39 
52 
+35 
+47 
+72 
.01 
.001 
.001 
Level of 
% Diff. Significance 
0 Not Sig. 
- 2 Not Sig. 
+11 .10 
Level of 
% Diff. Significance 
+ 8 
+ 1 
+9 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
Level of 
% Diff. Significance 
57 - 1 .20 
Not Sig. 
.05 
48 -30 
34 -40 
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E. Income 
Under $5000- $10000- $15000- $20000- Over Level of 
Sample $5000 $10000 $15000 $20000 $25000 $25000 % Diff. Significance 
General Public 59 72 40 75 66 41 -18 .01 
Petit Jurors 82 76 58 39 52 49 -33 .05 
Grand Jurors 86 79 71 34 49 27 -59 .02 
F. Correlation Coefficients205 
Nonwhite Female 
Sample Age Race Sex Occupation Income 
General Public .30 .00 .05 -.09 -.05 
Petit Jurors .30 -.04 .00 -.14 -.26 
Grand Jurors .55 .10 .07 -.37 -.44 
The figures for age show large differences of opinion between 
younger and older people in all three groups sampled, especially in 
the sample of grand jurors. The correlation table shows that the cor-
responding correlation coefficients for age are also large and positive 
(.30, .30 and .55 for the general public, petit juror and grand juror 
samples respectively). The percentages for race and sex show small 
differences. The corresponding correlation coefficients for race and 
sex are therefore also small. The greatest difference in attitude by 
race or sex occurs between whites and nonwhites in the grand juror 
sample, where eleven percent more nonwhites than whites agreed 
with the statement. Similarly, the largest correlation, .10, appears for 
the nonwhite race variable in the grand juror sample. (The negative 
sign preceding the correlation coefficient of -.04 for the nonwhite-
race variable in the petit juror sample indicates that in that sample, 
as opposed to the other nonwhite samples, fewer nonwhites than 
whites agreed with Statement 6.) 
The percentage figures for occupation and income show that 
205. In this context, positive correlations mean that older people agree more than younger 
people, nonwhites more than whites, females more than males, higher-occupational-status per-
sons more than lower-occupational-status persons, and high-income persons more than low-
income persons. Negative correlations mean the opposite. 
Correlations or regression coefficients must be approximately .15 to be significant at the .05 
level in the general public and petit juror samples. In the smaller grand juror sample, correla-
tions must be about .20 to be significant at the .05 level. 
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these two variables are more strongly related to attitude than are 
race and sex. For example, in the grand juror sample, all of the op-
eratives and laborers agreed with Statement 6, while only thirty-four 
percent of the professional and technical workers agreed. It is some-
what difficult to interpret these data, however, because income and 
occupation have somewhat inconsistent effects and because each of 
these two social characteristics has a large number of categories.206 
Correlation coefficients therefore are particularly useful in summa-
rizing these data. The correlation coefficients for occupation and in-
come are all negative, indicating that persons of lower occupational 
status and lower income agreed more often than persons of higher 
occupational status and higher income. The correlation coefficients 
for occupation and income also vary considerably among the three 
samples. They are negligible in the general public sample, moderate 
in the petit juror sample, and strong in the grand juror sample. 
Viewing the correlation coefficients as a whole, it is clear that age 
correlates more strongly and consistently with attitudes than do any 
of the other variables. 
Table 8 shows the correlation coefficients for all five variables 
and all twenty-one opinion statements for each of the three samples. 
The brief phrases included in the table summarize the original state-
ments. Most of the opinion statements were phrased in a "conserva-
tive" manner; the exceptions are numbers I, 7, 12, and 23, which are 
identified by footnote "a" in the table. The negative correlation 
coefficients of age for these four statements are explained by the fact 
that older people generally agreed with them less often than younger 
people. 
Table 8 is divided into three sections: (A) general public, (B) petit 
jurors, and (C) grand jurors. The largest correlation coefficient for 
each statement is starred in order to highlight the relative impor-
tance of each of the five variables. In the sample of the general pub-
lic, age correlates most strongly with twelve of the twenty-one 
opinion statements. Income correlates most strongly with three 
statements, race, sex, and occupation with two statements each. 
Thus, in this sample, attitudes correlate much more strongly with age 
than with any other variable. 
206. A good example of the inconsistency of these effects occurs in the general public sam-
ple for the occupational variable. Although the percentage difference listed is -1%, the differ-
ence is -27% if craftsmen and foremen (75%) are compared with clerical workers (48%), and 
the difference is +24% if service workers (58%) are compared with managers and administra-
tors (82%). 
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TABLE 8 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND 
TWENTY-ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GEN-
ERAL PUBLIC, PETIT JURORS, AND GRAND JURORS 
A. General Public 
Nonwhite Female Occu-
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation 
1. Better to let guilty go freea -.10 .03 -.18* .16 
2. Police should use force .34* -.13 .08 -.03 
3. Capital punishment effective .26* -.04 .06 -.20 
4. Courts too easy on young .32* .10 .00 -.06 
5. Police should arrest suspicious .32* .01 .II -.31 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .30* .00 .05 -.09 
7. Police often lie for one 
anothera -.14 .15* -.08 .01 
8. Older people wiser .23* .01 .02 -.12 
9. Young respect law less .31* .12 .08 .00 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .27* .03 .19 -.21 
11. Police arrest with good reason .21 -.29* .04 -.15 
12. Innocent are often trieda -.08. -.03 -.04 -.II 
13. Obedience to authority 
important .25* .04 .06 -.23 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .15 .20 .21 -.26* 
15. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .06 -.04 .06 -.17* 
19. Follow DA on indictment .19 -.09 .23* -.II 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .25 .03 .12 -.24 
21. Change vote to go with 
majority .26* -.01 .13 -.09 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
evidence .40* -.II .18 -.24 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictmenia -.II -.03 .02 .10 
24. Should be "older, experienced 
people"b .31* .04 .01 -.22 
-continued-
• Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
Income 
.15 
-.II 
-.12 
-.02 
-.21 
-.05 
.01 
-.08 
-.16 
-.22 
-.01 
-.17* 
-.24 
-.23 
-.08 
-.20 
-.30* 
-.20 
-.31 
-.ts• 
-.13 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlation 
was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
Section B of Table 8 shows the same general pattern for the petit 
jurors. Age correlates most strongly with nine of the twenty-one 
opinion statements, while income ·correlates most strongly with five. 
Race, sex, and occupation show the strongest correlations with only 
four, one, and two statements, respectively.207 
Section C of Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients for 
grand jurors. Income emerges as the characteristic correlating most 
207. Age is starred for Statement 20 in the petitjury sample as having the highest correla-
tion (.28) even though income has a correlation of apparently equal strength (-.28), because 
age had a slightly str~nger correlation before rounding. 
June 1978] Young Adults as a Cognizable Group 
B. Petit Jurors 
Nonwhite Female Occu-
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation 
I. Better to let guilty go freea -.04 .05 .00 .12 
2. Police should use force .18 -.19* .02 -.08 
3. Capital punishment effective .06 -.23* .02 -.12 
4. Courts too easy on young .24* -.02 -.05 -.21 
5. Police should arrest suspicious .29* -.17 .07 -.13 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .30* -.04 .00 -.14 
7. Police often lie for one 
anothera -.07 .20* .00 -.07 
8. Older people wiser .36* .02 -.07 -.28 
9. Young respect law less .33* .00 .07 -.21 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .28 .04 .12 -.21 
11. Police arrest with good reason .33* -.18 .06 -.25 
12. Innocent are often trieda .01 .II -.12* -.02 
13. Obedience to authority impor-
tant .37 -.08 -.05 -.39* 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .09 -.06 .07 -.10 
15. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .06 -.08 -.10 -.12* 
19. Follow DA on indictment .12 -.16* .12 -.12 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .28* -.17 .08 -.16 
,21. Change vote to go with 
majority .20 -.10 .01 -.23 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
evidence .26* -.12 .03 -.24 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictment3 -.05 .01 .08 .16 
24. Should be "older, experienced 
people"b .29* -.03 .13 -.16 
-continued-
* Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
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Income 
.24* 
-.09 
.00 
-.07 
-.28 
-.26 
.04 
-.18 
-.29 
-.33* 
-.20 
-.06 
-.32 
-.28* 
-.11 
-.06 
-.28 
-.26* 
-.21 
.20* 
-.18 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlation 
was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
strongly with 10 of the statements. Age correlates most strongly with 
seven statements, while race, sex, and occupation show the strongest 
correlations with three, none and one statements respectively. Over-
all, Table 8 demonstrates that attitudes correlate more strongly with 
age than with any of the other variables tested. 
b. Multiple regression analysis. The correlation analysis pro-
vides evidence that age is a more important determinant of these 
opinions than the other social characteristics. However, correlation 
analysis is not conclusive, because it considers only two variables at 
a time ( one social characteristic in relation to one opinion state-
ment). The final step of a thorough analysis requires a statistical 
technique capable of analyzing several variables at a time, that is, a 
technique which can examine the relationships of all the social char-
acteristics to each opinion statement simultaneously. 
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C. Grand Jurors 
Nonwhite Female Occu-
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation Income 
1. Better to let guilty go free• -.06 .03 .16 .17* .12 
2. Police should use force .22 -.II .04 -.21 -.30* 
3. Capital punishment effective .01 -.35* -.02 .02 -.08 
4. Courts too easy on young .24* -.04 .00 -.16 -.22 
5. Police should arrest suspicious .35* -.10 .08 -.28 -.31 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .55* .IO .07 -.37 -.44 
7. Police often lie for one 
another• .04 .24* -.06 .16 .IO 
8. Older people wiser .45 .24 -.00 -.18 -.48* 
9. Young respect law less .43* .18 .07 -.07 -.37 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .32 .12 .07 -.10 -.35* 
11. Police arrest with good reason .09 -.09 .OS -.18 -.26* 
12. Innocent are often tried• .19* .08 .09 -.08 -.17 
13. Obedience to authority impor-
tant .52* .12 .08 -.30 -.38 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .19 .IO .09 -.22 -.26* 
IS. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .33 .06 .IS -.34 -.37* 
19. Folio\\'. DA on indictment .14 -.13 .00 -.10 -.25* 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .35 .17 .06 -.21 -.43* 
21. Change vote to go with 
majority .38 .23 .17 -.24 -.so• 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
evidence .31 .II .06 -.28 -.45* 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictment• -.03 .22• .03 -.10 -.02 
24. Should be "older, experienced 
people"b .33* .13 -.09 -.11 -.23 
* Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlation 
was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
The need for a multivariate analysis can be shown by a simple 
example. The correlations have shown that occupational status and 
family income generally are negatively correlated with the conserva-
tively phrased opinion statements: that is, persons with higher-status 
occupations less often agree with such statements than persons with 
lower-status occupations, and higher-income persons less often agree 
than lower-income persons. However, occupational status is itself 
positively correlated with income-persons with higher occupational 
status generally have higher incomes than persons with lower occu-
pational status.208 Therefore, the fact that persons of higher occupa-
tional status less often agree with these statements may be due either 
to their higher occupational status, or to their higher income, or to 
208. For the sample of the Queens County general public, the correlation between occupa-
tion and income was computed to be .23. The correlations were even higher for the petit juror 
(.33) and the grand juror (.46) samples. 
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both factors. A two-variable technique like correlation analysis can-
not distinguish that part of a correlation betw~en a social character-
istic and an opinion statement which is actually due to the 
characteristic, and that part which is due to the other social charac-
teristics with which the first characteristic is correlated. Only a mul-
tivariate technique can identify the independent effects of each social 
characteristic on the opinions expressed in the survey. 
Of the several different multivariate techniques, multiple regres-
sion analysis is considered the most widely applicable and statisti-
cally efficient.209 A multiple regression analysis therefore was 
performed for each of the twenty-one opinion statements using the 
regression routine in the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences.210 Multiple regression analysis has both similarities to and 
differences from correlation analysis. Like correlation analysis, mul-
tiple regression analysis produces a single number, called a standard-
ized regression coefficient, for each of the social characteristics in 
relation to an opinion statement. Regression coefficients, like corre-
lations, have algebraic signs which indicate the nature of the rela-
tionship. Once again, positive regression coefficients mean that older 
people, nonwhites, females, persons with higher occupational status, 
and persons with higher income agree with a statement more often 
than their counterparts. The most important di.ff erence between 
multiple regression coefficients and correlation coefficients is that the 
regression coefficient for a social characteristic represents the unique 
relationship of that characteristic to the opinion statement after the 
relationships of the other social characteristics have been controlled, 
for. This difference is not apparent from looking at a table of multi-
ple regression coefficients, but it means that multiple regression 
coefficients are statistically more sophisticated than correlation 
coefficients. 
A multiple correlation coefficient (R), and the square of that sta-
tistic (R2), called "R-square," are customarily presented in associa-
tion with a multiple regression analysis. The multiple correlation 
coefficient, R, shows the total correlation of all five social character-
istics with the opinion statement. It varies between O and 1.00 and 
employs no algebraic sign. The R2 statistic is the only one which can 
be given a common-sense percentage interpretation. It shows the 
percent of the variation in response to each opinion statement which 
is explained or accounted for by the five social characteristics in 
combination. As is not uncommon in social science research, the R 2 
statistics are fairly low, indicating that many other social and psy-
209. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 203, at 357. 
210. N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE 
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975). 
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chological characteristics in addition to the five studied also affect 
these opinion statements. 
The multiple regression analyses for the twenty-one opinion 
statements, including the five standardized regression coefficients 
and the Rand R2 statistics, are shown in Table 9. The highest re-
gression coefficient for each opinion statement is starred to facilitate 
evaluation of the results. 
TABLE 9 
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND 
TWENTY-ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GEN-
ERAL PUBLIC, PETIT JURORS, AND GRAND JURORS 
A. General Public 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Non-
white Female Occu-
Multiple 
Correla-
tions 
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation Income R R2 
I. Better to let guilty go freea - .06 
2. Police should use force .32* 
3. Capital punishment effective .24* 
4. Courts too easy on young .33* 
5. Police should arrest suspi-
cious .28* 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .29* 
7. Police often lie for one 
anothera -.12 
8. Older people wiser .22* 
9. Young respect law less .30* 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .22* 
11. Police arrest with good rea-
.08 
-.13 
-.06 
.11 
-.03 
.00 
.16* 
.01 
.13 
-.01 
-.17* 
.06 
.04 
-.03 
.08 
.03 
-.09 
.00 
.01 
.16 
.15 
-.01 
-.18 
-.01 
-.26 
-.07 
.03 
-.09 
.08 
-.17 
.08 
-.07 
-.05 
.02 
-.II 
.00 
-.02 
-.03 
-.14 
-.13 
.27 .08 
.37 .14 
.33 .I I 
.34 .12 
.45 .20 
.30 .09 
.22 .05 
.26 .07 
.36 .13 
.40 .16 
son .18 -.32* .07 -.20 .04 .41 .17 
12. Innocent are often tried3 -.11 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.ts• .23 .05 
13. Obedience to authority 
important .21* .02 .02 -.17 -.17 .37 .14 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .11 .15 .17 -.20• -.14 .41 .17 
15. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .03 -.08 .07 -.17* -.03 .20 .04 
19. Follow DA on indictment .15 -.13 .21* -.09 -.13 .35 .12 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .20 -.01 .07 -.18 -.23* .41 .17 
21. Change vote to go with 
majority .24* -.02 .09 -.04 -.15 .33 .II 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
the evidence .35* -.15 .14 -.18 -.22 .54 .29 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictment3 
24. Should be "older, 
experienced people"b 
-.12 -.03 -.01 .13 -.20* .24 .06 
.29* .03 -.01 -.17 -.06 .37 .13 
-continued-
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression 
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
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Overall, Table 9 confirms the conclusion that age is the most im-
portant social characteristic in relation to the opinion statements in 
the general public and the petit juror samples and that it is second in 
importance to income in the sample of grand jurors. In the sample of 
the general public, age has the strongest relationship to twelve of the 
twenty-one statements; in the petit juror sample, age has the highest 
regression coefficient for nine of the statements. In the grand juror 
sample, however, income has the strongest relationship to nine state-
ments,211 while age is the most important characteristic for seven. 
B. Petit Jurors Multiple 
Correla-
Standardized Regression Coefficients tions 
Non-
white Female Occu-
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation Income R R2 
I. Better to let guilty go free• .04 .04 .01 .06 .23* .25 .06 
2. Police should use force .15 -.18* .05 -.05 -.02 .26 .07 
3. Capital punishment effective .03 -.24* .06 -.15 .07 .28 .08 
4. Courts too easy on young .21* -.01 -.02 -.18 .04 .29 .08 
5. Police should arrest suspi-
cious .22* -.16 .08 -.02 -.20 .39 .15 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .24* -.02 .00 -.02 -.19 .35 .13 
7. Police often lie for one 
anothera -.07 .19* .00 -.09 .04 .23 .05 
8. Older people wiser .31 * .05 -.04 -.18 -.04 .42 .18 
9. Young respect law less .26* .02 .07 -.09 -.18 .40 .16 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .20 .05 .12 -.10 -.24* .41 .17 
11. Police arrest with good reason .26* -.17 .10 -.18 -.05 .42 .18 
12. Innocent are often tried3 .00 .13 -.14* .03 -.08 .19 .04 
13. Obedience to authority 
important .25 -.05 -.02 -.28* -.16 .51 .26 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .01 -.05 .06 -.02 -.26* .29 .08 
15. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .01 -.06 -.09* -.08 -.09 .19 .03 
19. Follow DA on indictment .09 -.17* .16 -.13 .03 .27 .07 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .21* -.15 .09 -.06 -.19 .39 .15 
21. Change vote to go with 
majority .11 -.09 .02 -.16 -.17* .33 .11 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
the evidence .18* -.11 .06 -.18 -.10 .35 .13 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictment3 .03 .00 .08 .10 .19* .24 .06 
24. Should be "older, 
experienced people"b .25* -.03 .14 -.09 -.07 .34 .12 
-continued-
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression 
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
211. The data in Table 9 support the additional conclusion that occupation and income 
groups are cognizable. The multiple regression coefficients for occupation and income show a 
strong relationship between these characteristics and attitudes for many of the opinion state-
ments in all three samples. Other recent studies also have shown that members of different 
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C. Grand Jurors Multiple 
Correla-
Standardized Regression Coefficients lions 
Non-
white Female Occu-
Opinion Statements Age Race Sex pation Income R R2 
l. Better to let guilty go freea -.03 .11 .25* .17 .12 .30 .09 
2. Police should use force .12 -.19 -.10 -.12 -.24* .37 .14 
3. Capital punishment effective .00 -.38* -.11 .01 -.16 .38 .15 
4. Courts too easy on young .18* -.11 -.12 -.09 -.14 .31 .09 
5. Police should arrest suspi-
cious .28* -.19 -.08 -.20 -.12 .45 .21 
6. Taking fifth amendment is 
hiding .45* -.03 -.12 -.22 -.14 .62 .38 
7, Police often lie for one 
anothera .11 .27* .03 .18 .II .33 .II 
8. Older people wiser .27 .15 -.15 .07 -.40* .58 .34 
9. Young respect law less .31 * .13 -.04 .15 -.28 .50 .25 
10. Several charges, guilty of one .19 .07 -.03 .09 -.29* .40 .16 
11. Police arrest with good rea-
son -.05 -.14 -.06 -.10 -.27* .31 .09 
12. Innocent are often trieda .13* .06 .05 .01 -.09 .22 .OS 
13. Obedience to authority 
important .44* .01 -.08 -.15 -.11 .55 .31 
14. Defendant must prove 
innocenceb .07 .05 .01 -.11 -.17* .30 .09 
15. Vote guilty despite lack of 
evidenceb .18 -.02 .01 -.21* -.18 .44 .20 
19. Follow DA on indictment .04 -.19 -.12 -.02 -.28* .32 .10 
20. Waive right and let DA ask 
questions .17 .10 -.08 -.01 -.35* .48 .23 
21. Change vote to go with 
majority .14 .18 .04 .02 -.40* .54 .29 
22. Follow DA since he knows 
the evidence .11 .02 -.10 -.10 -.37* .47 .22 
23. DAs conceal evidence for 
indictmenta -.08 .23* .06 -.09 .03 .25 .06 
24. Should be "older, ,exper-
ienced people"b .30* .05 -.19 -.01 -.12 .39 .15 
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred. 
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner. 
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression 
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated. 
occupational and income groups differ in knowledge, expertise, and attitudes on matters of 
importance in jury service. 
One researcher interviewed jurors following trial in 23 cases. He found that particularized 
occupational knowledge or experience appeared to have affected the decision in eight of the 16 
civil cases studied and that occupational bias played a part in four of the seven criminal cases 
studied. Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary 
Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1079 (1965). 
Data presented in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 197, support 
the conclusion that income groups are cognizable. Nationwide samples were questioned about 
criminal justice issues, and the results show a strong relationship between attitudes and in-
come. In 1975, respondents in 13 selected American cities were asked: "How safe do you feel 
or would you feel about being out alone in your neighborhood during the day?" Of those with 
incomes under $3,000 and those with incomes from $3,000 to $5,000, only 31 % and 32% respec-
lively answered "very safe." By contrast, of those with incomes from $15,000 to $20,000, from 
$20,000 to $25,000, and over $25,000, fully 53%, 56%, and 61 % respectively offered that answer. 
Id. at 304 table 2.8. 
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The multiple regression analysis thus shows that age is the most im-
portant of these social characteristics in relation to attitudes which 
are important in jury deliberations. The stronger correlations for age 
are not the accidental result of its correlations with the other social 
characteristics. Rather, they show the greater impact of age upon a 
person's opinion, independent of his or her sex, race, occupation, or 
income. 
In sum, the data support the following conclusions. First, there 
are significant differences in attitudes between younger and older 
people in all three samples for nearly all of the twenty-one opinion 
statements. Second, the differences in attitudes generally progress 
systematically from the youngest to the oldest age groups. Third, in 
most cases, the greatest differences in attitudes occur between the 
youngest and oldest age groups. Fourth, the correlations between 
attitudes and age are stronger than the correlations between attitudes 
and race, sex, occupation or income. Fifth, these stronger correla-
tions are not due to the correlation of age with one of the other social 
characteristics mentioned; age independently affects attitude. 
CONCLUSION 
In the 1940s, courts assumed that a broad range of groups were 
cognizable. The danger of bias from the exclusion of an identifiable 
group and the possibility that its exclusion would cause a distinct 
"flavor" to be lost and would undermine the cross-sectional ideal 
warranted the recognition that a group was cognizable. More re-
cently, courts have required proof that groups satisfy newly articu-
lated c;riteria of cognizability. By too stringently applying these 
criteria, courts have insulated discrimination in jury selection from 
effective challenge. 
Even by modem standards, Part III above demonstrates that 
young adults are cognizable. They are distinct and identifiable; they 
share attitudes and experiences which cannot be represented ade-
quately by their elders; and their underrepresentation on juries re-
sults in bias against young criminal defendants and distorts the 
deliberative process. In light of this convincing evidence, courts 
Another group of respondents was asked whether or not they agreed that law enforcement 
agencies should be tougher than they are now in dealing with crime and lawlessness. Only 
73% of those with incomes under $3,000 agreed, compared to 88% of those with incomes over 
$15,000. Id. at 316 table 2.29. Similarly strong relationships between income and attitudes 
were found in questions dealing with the death penalty and legalization of marijuana. Gener-
ally, lower-income people were less likely to favor the use of the death penalty or legalization 
of marijuana than higher-income people. Id. at 327 table 2.61, 342 table 2.91. 
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should take judicial notice that young adults are cognizable, without 
requiring proof case by case.212 
Although young adults meet the modem test, other groups might 
be unable to present as clear or dramatic evidence of their 
cognizability. In such cases, courts should reconsider the strict appli-
cation of cognizability criteria. If a community group is sufficiently 
large and can be identified easily by questions on jury-qualification 
questionnaires, it should not be denied recognition simply because 
the boundaries of the group are somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, 
courts should use their common sense in determining whether a 
given group shares common attitudes and experiences which cannot 
be represented adequately by others. Although courts reasonably 
can ask those seeking to establish the cognizability of particular 
groups to submit proof on the issue, they should not necessarily re-
quire movants to submit proof as complex or sophisticated as that 
presented above. 
Of course, the state has an administrative interest in selecting ju-
ries through flexible methods. But courts can protect that interest 
when evaluating the merits of a jury selection complaint. To invoke 
that interest as a justification for denying cognizability is irrational, 
for it broadly and unnecessarily disqualifies entire groups from any 
judicial help in securing representation on juries. 
If additional groups are recognized, the result will be more repre-
sentative juries. As the Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Texas, "it 
is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments 
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the 
community."213 Continued failure to extend cognizability to com-
munity groups can only undermine the vitality and integrity of the 
jury as a democratic institution. 
212. In exceptional cases, courts might be justified in refusing to take judicial notice of the 
cognizability of the young. For example, in an isolated, conservative, rural community, the 
young might be less likely to have distinct attitudes than in a more urban setting. In such a 
community, the court could properly require specific proof of the attitudes of the community's 
young adults. But this Article's argument for cognizability has been sufficiently strong that 
these exceptions should be rare. 
213. 311 U.S. at 130. 
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The survey was designed to elicit attitudes of a cross section of 
the Queens County population and to determine whether there are 
significant variations in attitude among people in age, sex, race, oc-
cupation, and income groups concerning the criminal justice system 
and petit and grand jury service. A questionnaire (Exhibit 1) was 
developed by Eric Swanson, Elissa Krause, Donald Zeigler, and Jay 
Schulman, and consultation was provided by Richard Christie and 
Robert Buckhout. Questions were included which would reflect a 
wide range of attitudes toward law and the legal system and toward 
petit and grand jury service. 
Names of persons to be interviewed were taken from three 
sources-the Queens County petit jury rolls, grand jury rolls and the 
telephone book. Although both petit and grand jurors in Queens 
County ultimately come from the general population and grand ju-
rors are selected from among persons qualified to serve as petit ju-
rors, the selection procedures for both petit and grand jurors involve 
many subjective judgments by personnel of the County Clerk's of-
fice. Because the selection procedures are not random, it could not 
be assumed that the attitudes of petit jurors are representative of the 
attitudes of the general population or that the attitudes of grand ju-
rors are representative of the attitudes of either of these groups. In 
fact, the survey results show significant disparities in response to 
many of the opinion statements in the questionnaire among the three 
groups. Only by sampling all three groups could a complete picture 
of their attitudes emerge. 
Most interviewers were Legal Aid attorneys and law students 
who were summer volunteers with the Legal Aid Society. Interview-
ers were trained by Eric Swanson and other members of the staff of 
the National Jury Project, including Elissa Krause and Lee O'Brien. 
Interviews of petit jurors and members of the general public were 
conducted between approximately 6:00 and 9:30 p.m. Monday 
through Thursday for a four-week period commencing Monday, 
July 26, 1976. The grand jurors were surveyed during the evening 
hours from September 7 to 9, 1976. 
Random Telephone Sample of the General Public 
The sample universe consisted of all persons between the ages of 
18 and 75 living in a household with a telephone. Approximately 
640 telephone numbers were taken at random from the 1975-1976 
Queens telephone directory. The numbers chosen were not called. 
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Instead, they became "seeds" for the development of new numbers. 
The final phone sample was derived by adding one digit to the seed 
numbers (e.g., 978-0970 became 978-0971). This process effectively 
randomized the numbers and eliminated possible bias due to the fact 
that some eligible respondents have unlisted phone numbers. 
Interviewers were given computer grids (Exhibit 2)A1 to deter-
mine which person to interview at each phone number reached. The 
purpose of the grid was to eliminate any bias by reason of age- or 
sex-related phone answering patterns and thus insure that the sample 
was truly random. The interviewers were instructed that upon 
reaching a household, they should determine the total number of 
persons between the ages of 18 and 75 in the household and locate 
this number on the horizontal axis. They should then ask how many 
of the people in this age group were males and locate this number on 
the vertical axis. By looking in the box on the grid at the point of 
intersection, the interviewers would determine which household 
member to interview-e.g., the "second oldest female," the "young-
est male," the "oldest male," etc. Interviewers were instructed to 
speak only to the person assigned by the grid. 
A standard i.J;itroduction was provided for interviewers to obtain 
the necessary preliminary identifying information. Interviewers 
were instructed to record on their call-record sheets all calls except 
disconnected numbers reached during the course of the random tele-
phone survey. A total of 232 interviews was completed. 
Petit Juror Sample 
The sample universe consisted of the approximately 200;000 per-
sons on the petit jury rolls in Queens County. Individual names 
were drawn from the set of completed petit jury questionnaires of 
qualified petit jurors by choosing every twentieth questionnaire. 
Eight hundred forty-six names were drawn from file drawers labeled 
1973; 845 names were taken from file drawers labeled 1974; and 823 
names were drawn from file drawers labeled 1975. The name, age, 
and phone number of each person selected were written on a three-
by-five index card. 
The sample was then stratified as follows. The index cards were 
sorted into decades; that is, cards of people in their 20s were placed 
together, cards of people in their 30s were placed together, and so 
forth. There were no persons aged 18 or 19. Cards for people over 
Al. Exhibit 2 is an example of a grid. A large number of different grids were generated 
by a computer in order to randomize the selection of respondents. 
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age 75 were excluded because they are not eligible for jury duty. A 
subsample of 300 names ·was drawn at random from six age groups 
in numbers sufficient to insure that each age group was represented 
in proportion to its numbers in the population as a whole. The ap-
propriate percentage to be chosen fr9m each age group was deter-
mined from 1970 census data. The percei;itage chosen from each age 
group was as follows: 
20s - 22.2% 
30s - 15.6% 
40s - 19.7% 
50s - 20.3% 
60s - 16.0% 
70-75 - 6.2% 
Sampling was also controlled so that equal numbers of persons from 
each of the years 1973, 1974, and 1975 were included. 
Interviewers were given the index card showing the respondent's 
name, phone number, and age. They were instructed to ask for the 
respondent by name, confirm that they had the right person, and 
interview no_ one else. Two hundred twenty-nine interviews were 
completed from the petit-jury-pool sample. 
Grand Juror Sample 
The sample of grand jurors came from two sources. The first 
source was the Queens County Grand Jurors Liable Register for 
1975. Data ha_d previously been collected by the Legal Aid Society 
on the race, sex, occupation, and age of every third person on that 
Register. However, attempts to contact these· people by telephone 
revealed that there were far too few women, nonwhites, and young 
people in this sample to draw reliable conclusions. Additional 
names of people in these specific categories were drawn from the 
1974 Liable Register-to complete the survey. This process of over-
sampling ensured that women, nonwhites, and young people were 
surveyed in sufficient numbers so that the. answers obtained were 
typical of people in these groups. Subsequently, these oversampled 
groups were weighted back to their original proportions so that the 
overall survey results would accurately reflect the attituqes of 
Queens County grand jurors as a whole. Appendix B describes this 
and other standard statistical weighting procedures utilized in the 
study. A total of 118 grand juror interviews was completed. 
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INTERVIEWER'S NAME: ________ DATE: __ _ 
RESPONDENT'S NAME: _______ PHONE NO: __ _ 
SOURCE: __________________ _ 
Hello Mr./Ms. ______ . My name is ______ . I'm work-
ing with the Legal Aid Society of New York. We're doing a public opinion 
survey of peoples' attitudes towards the criminal justice system. The court 
has granted us permission to conduct this survey. I'd like to take a few 
minutes of your time to ask your opinions. Everything you say will be kept 
completely confidential. OK? 
(If appropriate: refer to sampling grid.) 
For the first set of questions I'm going to read some opinion statements. 
For each statement would you please tell me whether you agree strongly, 
agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly. There are no 
right or wrong answers. We're only interested in your opinions. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS: 
Coding: I. agree strongly 
2. agree somewhat 
3. disagree somewhat 
4. disagree strongly 
DO NOT 
READ. 9. don't know 
Repeat scale as often as necessary until you are sure that respondent 
has it clearly. If respondent only answers "agree" or "disagree" be 
sure to ask "somewhat or strongly?" 
CIRCLE CORRECT NUMBER 
I. It is better to let some guilty people go free 
rather than risk sending innocent people to jail. 2 3 4 9 
2. Police should not hesitate to use force to main-
tain order. 2 3 4 9 
3. Capital punishment is more effective than a life 
sentence in keeping people from committing 
murder. 2 3 4 9 
4. The courts allow young people to get away with 
too much too easily. 2 3 4 9 
5. Police should be allowed to arrest and question 
suspicious looking persons to determine whether 
they have been up to something illegal. 1 2 3 4 9 
6. A witness who takes the fifth amendment is 
probably hiding his or her guilt of a crime. 2 3 4 9 
7. Police will often lie to cover up for one another. 2 3 4 9 
8. In tough situations, older people almost always 
make wiser decisions than younger people. 1 2 3 4 9 
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9. Young people have less respect for law than 
older people. I 2 3 4 
10. A person accused of several different crimes is 
probably guilty of at least one of them. I 2 3 4 
11. The police don't make arrests unless they have 
good reason to believe that a crime has been 
committed. I 2 3 4 
12. Too often, the government brings people to trial 
who are really not guilty. I 2 3 4 
13. Obedience to authority is the most important 
virtue children should learn. I 2 3 4 
NOW I HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS ON THE JURY SYSTEM. 
14. In criminal cases, the judge instructs the jury that the defendant 
must be considered innocent unless proven guilty. However, many 
people think that a defendant has the responsibility to prove his or her 
innocence. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case, would 
you follow the judge's instructions or would you want the defendant to 
prove innocence? 
I. follow judge's instructions 
2. defendant must prove innocence 
15. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case and truly be-
lieved that the person on trial was guilty but the evidence didn't prove 
it, would you vote to find the person guilty or not guilty? 
I. guilty 2. not guilty · 
16. Have you ever been called for jury service? 
I. yes-GO TO Q. 16A 
2. no-skip to Q. 17 
16A. Did you actually serve on a jury? 
I. yes 2. no 8. doesn't apply 
17. Have you heard of a grand jury? 
I. yes-GO TO Q. 18 
2. no-skip Q. 18. 
18. Can you tell me in your own words 
what a grand jury does? 
PROBE ONCE 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
INTERVIEWER: READ DESCRIPTION OF GRAND JURY TO ALL 
RESPONDENTS. 
To put it briefly, this is what a grand jury does-
The grand jury does not decide whether a person is guilty or innocent. 
Rather, the District Attorney presents his case and the grand jury decides 
whether he has enough evidence to make a person stand trial on criminal 
charges. A judge is not present at a grand jury proceeding. [When the 
grand jury decides that someone should _stand trial, that is called an indict-
ment.] 
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Would you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
INTERVIEWER: AFTER EACH RESPONSE ASK, "SOMEWHAT OR 
STRONGLY?" and CIRCLE THE CORRECT NUMBER .. 
19. If a District Attorney strongly recommends an indict-
ment, grand jurors should go along with the recom-
mendation. I 2 3 4 9 
20. Grand jurors rarely need to exercise their right to ask 
questions of witnesses because they can rely on the 
District Attorney to ask all necessary questions. 1 2 3 4 9 
21. During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees 
with the rest of the jurors that person should change 
his or her vote to go along with the majority. 1 2 3 4 9 
22. Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the 
evidence the grand jury should always follow his rec-
ommendations. 1 2 3 4 9 
23. District Attorneys sometimes conceal evidence from 
a grand jury in order to get an indictment. I 2 3 4 9 
24. Do you think Society would be better served if the 
grand jury represented all segments of the commu-
nity or if it was composed of older, more experienced 
people? 
I. all segments 2. older, experienced people 1 2 3 4 9 
25. WHY? 
NOW I'M SUPPOSED TO ASK YOU A FEW MORE BACKGROUND 
QUESTIONS FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES ONLY. 
26. In what year were you born? 
27. What kind of work do you do? _____________ _ 
What industry do you work in? _____________ _ 
IF HOUSEWIFE, STUDENT, UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED, FIND 
OUT PAST JOB OR PART-TIME WORK. 
28. I. Under $5,000 
2. Between $5,000 and $10,000 
3. Between $10,000 and $15,000 
4. Between $15,000 and $20,000 
5. Between $20,000 and $25,000 
6. Over $25,000 
29. We are all Americans, but what country 
did your family originally come from? 
Is English your native language? 
I. yes 2. no 
30. How often do you attend religious services? 
I. more than once a week 
2. weekly 
3. several times a month · 
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4. once a month or less 
5. never 
31. What is your race? 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW IS COMPLETED. 
AGE ____ SEX ___ _ 
EXHIBIT 2 
Page 855 Seed = 421,637 
Eligible Number of Eligible Respondents 
Males 2 3 4 5 6 
0 YF 2 OF YF 3 OF YF 
I F YF 2 OF 2 OF M 
2 YM OM OM YM OM 
3 OM YM 2 OM YF 
4 YM OM OF 
5 YM OM 
6 3 YM 
7 
8 
1103 
7 8 
OF 4 OF 
2 YF M 
3 OF OM 
2 YF 2 OF 
2 YM OF 
2 OM 3 OM 
YM YM 
3 OM 3 OM 
YM 
Key: 0 = Oldest Y = Youngest 
M = Male F = Female 1,2,3, ... etc. = First, Second, Third ...• 
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL WEIGHTING PROCEDURES 
Because young persons are generally underrepresented, special 
efforts were made in conducting the public opinion survey to select a 
disproportionately large number of the young so that results for this 
group would have greater statistical reliability. Consequently, the 
percentages of young people in the petit juror and grand juror sam-
ples were proportionately larger than the percentages in the actual 
petit jury and grand jury pools. There were also small differences 
between the age distribution of the people in the sample of the gen-
eral public and the age distribution of the adult population of the 
county as a whole. Thus, before the data could be analyzed, the four 
age groups in all three samples had to be restored to their correct 
proportional frequencies. This was done by the standard process of 
statistical weighting. B 1 
Table 10 presents the number and percentage of persons in each 
age group in the samples before and after weighting. The left col-
umn for each sample gives the actual percentage of the respective 
population, by age group. The middle column lists the number and 
percentage in each sample before weighting and the right column 
lists the number and percentage after weighting. 
The weighting process can be illustrated by examining the data 
from the petit juror sample. Of the persons on the petit jury rolls, 
13.4% are between the ages of 18 and 30; however, 18.3% of the petit 
jurors sampled were in this age group. Thus, the 18-30 age group 
was overrepresented in the sample of petit jurors. To correct this 
overrepresentation, a fractional weight of 0.67 was accorded to each 
person in the group. The 42 persons were subsequently counted as 
28 persons, or 12.3% of the weighted sample, which is closer to their 
actual percentage (13.4%) in the petit jury pool. By contrast, persons 
between the ages of 61 and 75 constitute 25.6% of the people in the 
petit jury pool but only 19 .2% of the petit jurors sampled. To correct 
this underrepresentation, those in the 61-75 age group were given a 
weight of 1.36, restoring them to 25.9% of the weighted sample. 
The weights assigned in the general public and petit juror sam-
ples were designed to make the total number of persons in the sam-
ples before and after weighting as nearly identical as possible. 
However, weighting in the grand juror sample presented a special 
problem requiring a different procedure. People between the ages of 
Bl. For a general discussion of this process, see N. NIE, C. HULL,]. JENKINS, K. STEIN· 
BRENNER, & D. BENT, supra note 210. 
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18 and 30 constitute only 5.3% of the people on the grand jury rolls. 
Seventeen of these youngs adults were interviewed, and they consti-
tuted 14.4% of the sample of 118 grand jurors. If they had been 
given an appropriate fractional weight to correct their overrepresen-
tation, the number of young adults would have been reduced from 
TABLE 10 
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF PERSONS IN EACH AGE GROUP IN 
THE SAMPLES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, PETIT JURORS AND 
GRAND JURORS BEFORE AND AFTER STATISTICAL WEIGHTING 
General Public 
According to 1970 Survey Sample Survey Sample 
Census (Unweighted) (Weighted) 
Age % No. % Weight No. % 
18-30 27.0 69 30.8 0.88 61 27.0 
31-45 24.6 63 28.1 0.88 55 24.7 
46-60 29.1 51 22.8 1.28 64 28.5 
61-75 19.3 41 18.3 I.OS 45 19.9 
TOTAL 100.0 224 100.0 225 100.l 
Petit Jurors 
Survey Sample Survey Sample 
Petit Jury Rolls* (Unweighted) (Weighted) 
Age % No. % Weight No. % 
18-30 13.4 42 18.3 0.67 28 12.3 
31-45 21.2 47 20.5 1.00 46 19.9 
46-60 39.9 96 41.9 1.00 96 41.9 
61-75 25.6 44 19.2 1.36 59 25.9 
TOTAL 100.l 229 99.9 229 100.0 
Grand Jurors 
Survey Sample Survey Sample 
Grand Jury Rolls* (Unweighted) (Weighted) 
Age % No. % Weight No. % 
18-30 5.3 17 14.4 1.00. 17 5.4 
31-45 12.5 25 21.2 1.60 39 12.6 
46-60 31.2 35 29.7 2.86 98 31.2 
61-75 51.0 41 34.7 4.00 158 50.7 
TOTAL 100.0 118 100.0 312 99.9 
* The figures listing the percentages of people in each age bracket for the petit and grand 
jury rolls were taken from data gathered earlier by the Legal Aid Society. 
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17 to 6. Because the weighted sample would have been very small, 
rounding error in computing the weighted number of persons would 
have interfered seriously with the accuracy of subsequent statistical 
analysis. To overcome this problem, the 18-30 age group was 
weighted at 1.00 so that the 17 persons were still counted as 17. All 
other age groups were then given weights proportionately greater 
than 1.00 in order to restore the proper age distribution. This proce-
dure increased the sample size of grand jurors from an actual total of 
118 to a weighted total of 312. Increasing the total sample size in this 
manner does not alter the results in any way since all the statistics 
presented depend on relative proportions rather than absolute sam-
ple size. 
The primary reason for weighting is to insure that the samples 
properly represent age distribution in the population; however, there 
were also race and sex disparities between the composition of the 
samples and the composition of the populations from which the sam-
ples were drawn. In a test run, the samples were weighted simulta-
neously by age, sex, and race, except that petit jurors were weighted 
only by age and sex since the racial composition of the petit jury rolls 
was not available. The complete set of correlations between the five 
social characteristics and the 21 opinion statements was then com-
puted with the samples weighted by all the characteristics. The re-
sults were virtually identical to those computed when the samples 
were weighted only by age. Therefore, all the data presented here 
are weighted only by age. 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 11 
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PERCENTAGE IN EACH CATEGORY OF FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERIS-
TICS GIVING THE MOST CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO TWENTY-
ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
(GP), PETIT JURORS (PJ), AND GRAND JURORS (GJ)* 
Opinion 
Statements Age Race Sex Occupation Income 
:f 5 C u . 
~ 
• .!! .!! 8 ii-~ile= a ooc 
~§ §~ t~ t~ t~ ~~ 18- 31- 46- 61- ~~ 0 e ·--l! f ..8 ~ !l 'C ] ;~ i-5 -; 30 4S 60 75 ::E i:: j~ 8-'.l 5i 0 "' ::E<: ==~ :>in""':! s~ ~~ ~~ 0~ fl.I
GP 48 38 48 64 so 44 40 58 54 58 52 46 67 58 31 62 so 4S so 55 27 
#I PJ 49 ss 4S 62 54 44 53 46 57 59 58 6S 41 32 4S 74 66 65 39 38 41 
GJ 44 36 36 42 39 40 46 27 37 so 48 44 69 22 35 33 so 44 42 34 26 
GP 41 ss 59 87 62 44 58 60 56 64 62 57 61 59 53 68 56 58 56 SI 48 
#2 PJ ss 79 73 81 76 52 73 76 86 83 68 74 83 76 61 83 84 69 71 75 68 
GJ 56 49 77 80 77 61 72 78 100 100 S6 81 62 84 63 88 91 75 64 71 54 
or 60 74 72 93 74 69 71 75 91 90 79 68 76 72 59 8S 73 66 77 78 58 
#3 PJ 72 82 86 86 8S 66 84 SI 100 91 78 86 84 83 74 61 90 83 76. 86 84 
GJ 76 74 73 70 81 35 74 67 63 0 54 82 100 80 61 75 85 53 79 64 72 
GP 66 87 96 9S 84 94 86 86·, 87 88 96 82 68 92 85 90 82 83 87 81 b7 
#4 PJ 70 89 95 95 90 94 91 87 100 94 95 92 88 81 87 8S 96 87 86 92 93 
GJ 71 82 80 92 87 83 84 89 74 100 76 89 100 91 78 100 91 80 83 80 86 
GP 42 43 51 83 54 56 so 59 83 68 66 52 56 72 26 78 59 so S2 45 35 
#5 PJ 33 44 61 67 58 38 54 62 73 68 54 60 SI 39 48 74 74 54 so S6 34 
GJ 35 25 53 66 59 44 54 56 100 0 72 63 58 so 44 so 81 61 32 56 38 
GP 39 59 64 74 58 58 54 62 58 64 7S 48 · 56 82 57 59 72 40 75 66 41 
#6 PJ 33 so 52 "IJ S6 54 57 58 78 64 54 63 6S 39 48 82 76 58 39 52 49 
GJ 12 13 38 84 ss 66 54 63 74 100 70 69 74 S2 34 86 79 71 34 49 27 
GP 28 28 39 42 34 33 28 39 42 26 47 41 7 32 27 38 41 36 33 22 25 
#7 PJ 30 33 33 41 39 13 3S 37 53 14 37 44 30 IS 48 52 42 29 33 34 34 
GJ so 48 42 40 47 20 43 43 26 0 59 53 38 27 41 43 38 26 54 4S 28 
GP 29 36 35 59 38 38 36 39 S4 47 32 37 38 60 29 47 44 33- 36 17 42 
#8 PJ 18 22 46 62 41 44 44 37 67 61 52 30 46 31 29 44 54 56 31 26 43 
GJ 18 4 23 62 3S 63 37 43 0 100 57 52 57 23 27 71 79 56 14 29 13 
GP 48 62 63 90 63 70 61 6S 66 67 73 ss 59 69 67 8S 62 54 79 47 so 
#9 PJ 42 63 80 80 71 81 71 76 90 92 74 71 54 64 6S 89 94 69 71 56 64 
GJ 38 37 ss 86 64 87 66 73 74 100 63 72 67 73 59 88 93 90 58 56 47 
GP 53 44 63 83 59 63 48 69 79 69 61 59 63 32 48 74 64 60 58 45 40 
#10 PJ 38 54 60 n 60 64 ss 73 58 74 63 64 59 43 S3 39 85 73 SI 52 33 
GJ 41 28 37 66 47 6S 51 53 74 so 40 S2 S7 61 42 75 72 45 43 39 34 
GP 51 63 67 72 69 22 61 63 76 70 62 S8 72 72 so 62 so 63 62 65 67 
#II PJ 58 59 73 90 75 S2 71 83 100 81 83 76 67 62 60 89 95 71 70 54 75 
GJ 47 82 72 77 75 70 74 73 63 100 90 79 64 66 71 88 90 62 82 76 55 
GP 48 56 67 S8 58 60 55 61 so 56 38 56 57 78 65 49 45 58 55 77 72 
#12 PJ 62 66 S4 62 61 50 57 71 n 4S 58 74 47 4S 64 78 53 52 S7 73 54 
GJ 71 72 77 43 60 53 64 51 26 so 47 62 48 57 70 57 33 44 7S 72 59 
GP 61 71 75 90 72 78 72 73 86 96 87 63 87 74 S6 89 80 66 76 76 49 
i#l3 PJ S8 70 82 95 80 76 79 78 90 98 88 90 73 67 55 89 100 90 70 53 82 
GJ 41 34 78 93 76 90 77 80 100 100 84 89 88 74 60 100 100 80 58 7S 66 
• The most conservative response is "agree" on statements 2-6, 8-11, 13, and 19-22; "disagree" on 
statements 1, 7, 12, and 23; "defendant must prove innocence" on 14; "vote guilty" on 15; and "older, 
experienced people" on 24. 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Opinion 
Statements Age Race Sex Occupation Income 
.; cl 
u 8 li -~~ Ea ii ~.5 .. ~~ §.i i~ ~i §.~ !~ 18- 31- 46- 61- ~ -~ u ;; __ .,. f_g .:! !l 11 ~ ~~ ;; e i:l; & .. ~ ·5 = e """.c 30 45 60 75 " 11: .};~ o:l Utf 0 ;; i~ J:~ Vl ::>.,., .,.,_ -- -M l,ll(l l(j 
GP 40 36 45 61 40 69 34 56 76 51 45 36 66 36 22 62 61 41 34 43 23 
#14 PJ 36 16 28 40 30 21 28 38 20 36 32 39 24 21 20 22 64 34 26 13 14 
GJ 12 4 23 30 22 33 22 30 74 0 21 34 34 6 16 43 41 24 19 17 10 
GP 23 21 19 34 24 19 21 26 35 26 38 22 19 16 14 33 23 23 19 31 14 
#15 PJ 22 14 23 26 23 13 24 12 47 30 26 15 12 24 18 18 32 26 20 10 20 
GJ 12 13 9 47 28 35 25 40 74 100 30 36 36 18 13 86 35 31 5 2(1 19 
GP 44 39 49 62 50 33 36 58 51 43 44 63 5'i 42 26 65 52 50 40 32 24 
#19 PJ 27 30 39 41 38 14 34 53 40 45 37 37 3~ 31 28 33 34 39 32 45 28 
GJ 29 8 12 26 22 7 18 20 37 0 15 21 52 18 13 25 44 9 21 16 9 
GP 12 20 31 41 24 30 20 31 68 25 26 28 J(I 18 9 47 39 25 7 20 10 
#20 PJ 20 13 28 47 32 5 28 35 20 38 38 33 IS 13 28 ·22· 56 34 24 20 12 
GJ 6 4 15 38 21 40 24 24 0 100 11 42 46 0 15 75 35 14 7 36 5 
GP 7 7 8 33 12 12 9 16 ._4 10 29 5 12 20 7 24 26 9 9 6 0 
#21 PJ 2 9 13 18 13 8 12 16 10 36 12 9 9 5 2 26 14 29 2 s 4 
GJ 0 0 3 25 12 21 11 20 0 50 0 24 34 0 8 38 29 17 10 0 0 
GP 13 18 28 66 30 17 24 34 61 31 30 30 29 32 14 60 33 28 IS 13 19 
#22 PJ IO 9 20 37 23 8 20 23 10 42 32 24 II 11 IO ,~ 35 30 19 II 8 
GJ 6 0 9 28 15 28 16 · 17 0 so 51 20 17 12 6 so 44 17 10 7 2 
GP 13 30 36 29 26 30 28 28 33 28 40 24 28 14 24 13 16 3~ 38 29 33 
#23 PJ 24 42 21 37 IO 29 29 28 33 36 39 33 25 22 22 52 47 35 29 21 12 
GJ 36 24 42 41 41 24 41 36 26 0 23 35 38 52 43 57 12 18 44 33 38 
GP 10 18 25 50 23 28 24 25 50 36 32 11 24 18 15 38 28 19 24 30 9 
#24 PJ 10 14 32 47 30 25 28 44 22 36 46 31 24 20 18 30 41, 36 24 22 IR 
GJ 6 8 15 45 25 40 32 23 37 50 0 44 29 20 22 38 44 45 5 16 20 
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APPENDIX D: TABLE 12 
The demographic characteristics of the Queens County popula-
tion are compared with the characteristics of the United States popu-
lation in the table. 
TABLE 12 
COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF QUEENS 
COUNTY AND GENERAL U.S. POPULATION 
Under 18 Years 
18-64 
65 and over 
Median Age 
Race 
White 
Nonwhite 
Nationality-Heritage 
Foreign-born 
Native-born of foreign or 
mixed parentage 
Education 
Persons 25 and over: 
median school years attended 
Children in private elementary 
schools 
Economics 
Median income 
Below poverty level 
Incomes of $15,000 or more 
In white-collar positions 
U.S. 
34.3% 
55.9% 
9.9% 
28.l Years 
87.5% 
12.5% 
4.7% 
11.8% 
12.l Years 
11.5% 
$9,590 
10.7% 
20.6% 
48.2% 
Queens 
26.2% 
61.4% 
12.4% 
35.5 Years 
85.3% 
14.7% 
21.0% 
29.5% 
12.0 Years 
35.8% 
$11,555 
5.5% 
30.8% 
60.3% 
These data from the 1970 United States Census show that the 
Queens County population is distinctly older than the country's pop-
ulation. The median age of Queens County residents was 35.5 years, 
7.4 years older than the median age of the country's population. 
The racial make-up of Queens County differs little from that of 
the national population. Nonwhites made up 14.7% of the Queens 
County population and 12.5% of the population of the United States. 
More significantly, however, 50.5% of Queens County was either for-
eign-born or of foreign or mixed parentage. This compares to 16.5% 
in the general population. 
Of those Queens County residents 25 and over, the median num-
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ber of years of schools attended, 12.0, is nearly identical to that for 
the nation. But, substantially more children from Queens County are 
privately educated (35.8% of the elementary school children in 
Queens County but only 11.5% in the general population were in 
private schools in 1970). 
The percentage of Queens County residents in white-collar jobs 
in 1970, 60.3%, was twelve points higher than the corresponding per-
centage of the nation's work force. The median income in 1970, 
$11,555, was almost two-thousand dollars over the national median. 
Five and a half percent of Queens County residents were living be-
low the poverty level compared with 10.7% in the United States. The 
percentage of those earning $15,000 or more was 30.8% in Queens 
County, 20.6% nationally. 
